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11. Introduction
This dissertation mainly focuses on the decision to get involved in Mergers and
Acquisitions and the following consequences. At its peak, in 2007, the value
of cross border mergers and acquisitions exceeded the value of FDI greenfield
investments and thus, accounted for more than half of foreign direct investment
(FDI). As a consequence of the financial crisis, today this share was reduced to
about one third, amounting to 349 bn Dollars in 2013.1
Three separate papers are presented. The first two of these analyse tax-induced
consequences of mergers and acquisitions, where the target firm is in the focus. It
is analysed whether a tax advantage can be generated at the target firm, following
an acquisition. If this is the case, acquisitions are favoured by the tax system
and specifically those acquirers are favoured that are able to generate the highest
tax advantages.
The first paper is titled 'tax avoidance as a driver of mergers and acquisitions',
which is a joint research project with Martin Ruf (University of Tübingen), Chris-
tian Steffens (University of Mannheim) and Leslie Robinson (Tuck School of
Business at Dartmouth). We find that following an acquisition a target firm's
effective tax rate decreases significantly. This decline is even more pronounced
when the acquiring firm is tax aggressive. This finding supports the hypothesis
that acquiring firms are able to transport own tax characteristics to the target
level. Furthermore, target firm profitability decreases after a deal. This effect is
particularly strong in cross border acquisitions if targets' statutory tax rates are
higher than the statutory tax rate of the acquirer.
This group of cross border deals with a clear preference of shifting profits away
from the target firm, is analysed more deeply in the second paper. The paper
is titled 'Effects of tax avoidance on real activity in the target country following
1Source: UNCTAD (2014).
2M&A'. The first paper shows that for this specific group of target firms profit
shifting opportunities increase after the acquisition. Building on this result, I
show that due to these new opportunities cost of capital decrease. A positive
investment effect can be found in the target country. This positive effect is over-
compensated by a negative shifting effect if the target country effectively restricts
profit shifting via the manipulation of transfer prices. Target firms are found to
shift real activity instead of pure profits if such a rule is in force.
Furthermore, I analyse whether tax rules in the acquiring firm's country of resi-
dence can abolish those tax incentives. For that purpose, worldwide tax systems
and controlled foreign company rules (cfc) are considered. Both kinds of rules
result in a different calculation formula, where the statutory tax rate in the home
country determines the final tax burden instead of the subsidiary's statutory tax
rate. While there is clear evidence given for the effect of cfc rules, concerning
worldwide tax systems evidence is mixed.
The finding that credit systems cannot completely delete the tax advantage of
profit shifting raises the question for possible reasons. Here, the third paper
contributes to literature by analysing the adjustment of group structures to mit-
igate the negative effects of worldwide tax systems. The title of the third paper
is 'Corporate Group Complexity in Territorial and Worldwide Countries'. This
project bases on a common research idea with Christian Steffens (University
of Mannheim) and Johannes Voget (University of Mannheim). Descriptively it
can be shown that worldwide taxed groups structure foreign subsidiaries tax-
optimally, concerning repatriation tax cost. Along the ownership chain, repa-
triation taxes and withholding taxes are avoided, up to the final repatriation to
the home country of the group. Empirically there is given evidence that world-
wide taxed groups are structured more complex. There is an additional holding
company necessary, which stretches the ownership chain. This holding company
3executes functions that commonly would be located at the group's headquarter
and eases the deferral of foreign profits.
In the following, I will provide a brief overview over the relevant literature and
the contributions of this dissertation. Then the databases, which I made use
of, will be described and some figures on the initial samples will be presented.
The core of this dissertation are three separate papers, which will be presented
thereafter. Finally, I conclude with a general conclusion summarizing the most
important results.
42. Contributions to existing literature
Mergers and acquisitions and taxes
Dunning (1980) argues that foreign direct investment is motivated by ownership-
specific advantages. A firm will only engage in foreign markets if there is
a competitive advantage the firm can realize. Otherwise costly cross-border
transactions and monitoring cost would be an inevitable drawback. The same is
true regarding mergers and acquisitions. An acquisition will only take place if
the acquirer can outbid the reservation price of the seller of the firm2. Thus, the
acquirer has to expect higher future cash flows than the seller would be able to
generate.
There is a large empirical literature searching for sources of ownership advantages
in case of mergers and acquisitions.
One strand of literature analyzes the effect of mergers and acquisitions on
the operating performance of the merged firm, as reviewed by Martynova and
Renneboog (2008). Despite a large number of analyses, there is no clear picture
whether firms participating in mergers and acquisitions benefit, concerning their
operating performance.
Another strand of literature attempts to identify specific sources of synergy
gains. Ahuja and Katila (2001) document that a high knowledge base of a target
firm can result in additional innovation output of the acquiring firm. This effect
is especially pronounced if the knowledge bases are related, what is measured by
the number of patents being in use in both firms before the acquisition. A review
on studies which analyze synergy gains with respect to the demand for labor
input is presented by Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004). Most studies find a reduction
of the number of employees for the combined firm following mergers and
2Becker and Fuest (2010); Desai and Hines (2003).
5acquisitions. Conducting a matching approach, Lehto and Böckermann (2008)
find a decline in employment for manufacturing firms following cross-border
acquisitions of up to 20 percent. Conyon et al. (2002) document a decline of 19
percent in case of related mergers and a less pronounced decline of 8 percent in
case of unrelated mergers. These studies observe the effect on employment for
the combined firm. For periods before the acquisition, employment numbers are
added up for the single firms.
Auerbach and Reyshus (1988a) and Auerbach and Reyshus (1988b) are the first,
who analyze tax factors as a possible motivation for mergers and acquisitions.
They study the influence of loss carry forwards and excess tax credits on the
decision to acquire a specific firm. They find no evidence for the relevance of the
target firm's tax characteristics, but weak evidence for tax characteristics of the
acquiring firm.
Devos et al. (2009) identify tax savings as a possible source for synergy gains. It
is argued that a step up of the tax basis as well as interest tax shields can result
in a tax advantage for the combined firm. Devos et al. (2009) find tax savings
accounting for less than 17 percent of total synergies. Kaplan (1989) observes a
sample of 76 management buyouts between the years 1980 and 1986. He analyzes
the value of tax shields originating from an increasing use of debt or a step up
of the tax basis. His results indicate that taxes can be a considerable source
of wealth gains. These gains account for 21 to 140 percent of the premium the
acquirer pays to pre-buyout shareholders. Blouin et al. (2005) examine changes
in taxable income of U.S.-domiciled firms after their acquisition by foreign firms.
They do not find evidence that international acquirers reduce taxable income
more than domestic acquirers.
6While taking the effective tax rate and profit shifting into account, the first
two papers of this dissertation add a new source of possible tax gains to the
existing literature. The first paper analyzes the change in tax avoidance at the
target firm and differentiates for the three channels: Earnings management,
debt shifting and transfer pricing. The second paper relates the profit shifting
incentive to real effects at the level of the target firm.
The before mentioned literature examines the performance of mergers and ac-
quisitions using financial data. I do not directly contribute to this literature.
Nevertheless, it shell be mentioned that shareholder gains associated with merg-
ers and acquisitions are also widely analyzed. A review over literature is provided
by Jensen and Ruback (1983). Empirical evidence indicates large gains for share-
holders of the target firm. Estimations for shareholders of the bidding firm show
no clear picture. Hayn (1989) analyzes tax factors as a potential source for value
gains. Her findings indicate that unused tax credits and loss carry forwards ex-
plain abnormal returns partially. Regarding asset deals, a step up of the tax
basis is identified as an additional source for shareholder gains. Chow et al.
(2013) show that acquisitions enhance the shareholder's value if tax aggressive
acquirers acquire less aggressive target firms.
Real investment and taxes
Going back to the approach on cost of capital by Fullerton and King (1984),
the influence of taxes on investment is well documented. Cost of capital denote
a minimum rate of return, which is affordable to satisfy the requirements of
investors. With an increasing tax burden for the investment, compared to a
capital market investment, the required rate of return increases.3 As argued by
Overesch (2009), profit shifting opportunities in multinational firms result in a
lower tax burden and thus in reduced cost of capital in high tax countries. He
3Schreiber (2012), p. 640-645.
7finds empirical evidence that inbound investments into Germany increase with a
lower foreign owner's statutory tax rate. His results confirm the negative relation
between profit shifting opportunities and cost of capital.
Literature also documents that international profit shifting decouples investment
decisions from local tax rates. Indirect evidence is given by Grubert (2003). He
finds that research and development intensive firms are more likely to invest
in extremely high taxed and extremely low taxed locations. Direct evidence
is found by Overesch and Schreiber (2010). For specific industries, which are
characterized by a high volume of intra-firm transactions, results indicate that
investments are completely tax-inelastic.
Egger et al. (2014) differentiate for tax-avoiding and non-avoiding firms, classified
by an estimated ability to shift profits. His classification is based on variables
explaining profit shifting opportunities. Such variables are the size of the firm,
the tax-incentive to shift profits or the firm's affiliation to the research and
development sector. They find that tax-avoiding firm's foreign investments show
no reaction to the foreign tax rate at all. In contrast, the whole tax elasticity of
foreign investment is attributed to firms without the ability to shift profits.
Based on these results, it must be expected that investment decisions depend on
local tax rates if international profit shifting is restricted.
Most recently Buettner et al. (2014) test for the relation between the strictness
of anti profit shifting regulations and foreign direct investment for a sample of
German multinationals. They find that the existence of an interest deduction
restriction in the subsidiary country results in a significant reduction of foreign
direct investment. Furthermore, they find a higher tax-rate elasticity of foreign
direct investment in a country if the deduction of interest payments is restricted.
8This dissertation offers a very clean setting while comparing the same target firm
as a purely domestic firm and after the acquisition as a member of a multinational
group. This way, two effects can be related to each other: The positive invest-
ment effect and the negative shifting effect in case of a strict anti-tax avoidance
regulation. Moreover, it is possible to include tax rules of the acquiring firm's
country of residence into the analysis.
Group structures and the allocation of resources
The third paper contributes to literature explaining organizational structures of
firms. According to Coase (1937) firms are a vehicle to reduce transaction cost.
This is why specific functions are integrated into one firm. The coordination
within a firm requires alternative instruments, other than the market price
mechanism. Many researchers analyze whether the market price mechanism or
the intra-firm process for decision making is superior.
Going back to Jensen and Meckling (1976), there is a broad interest for conflicts
between shareholders and managers in the literature. Managerial behaviour
must not necessarily be in line with shareholders' aims. Instead, there is some
managerial discretion, where to allocate funds of the firm. This constitutes an
expropriation risk for shareholders.4
Besides this general risk of expropriation, particular sources for information
asymmetries are identified within a firm as well as between firms and sharehold-
ers.
According to Shin and Stulz (1998), the allocation of resources within diversified
multi-segment firms depends less on traditional market indicators. Harris et
al. (1982) highlight the importance of information asymmetries for diversified
firms. For a panel of U.S. firms Rajan et al. (2000) confirm empirically that a
high diversity of a firm is costly because investments are inefficiently allocated
4A literature review is provided in Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
9between divisions. Berger and Ofek (1995) show that the value of diversified
firms is about 15 percent less than a portfolio of matched single-segment firms.
Morck et al. (1990) find that diversifying acquisitions result in a decrease in firm
value.
The effect of decentralized decision-making processes within a firm is analyzed
by Garicano (2000) and Bloom et al. (2012). Bloom et al. (2012) substantiate
empirically that negative effects of a high decentralization can be overcome by
an environment with high social capital ('trust').
Comparable to the literature on conglomerate diversification, Bodnar et al.
(1999) argue that monitoring of managers is limited in complex, geographically
diversified firms. Denis et al. (2002) analyze the effect of geographic diversifi-
cation on firm values. They find that geographically diversified firms suffer a
valuation discount of about equal size as multi-segment firms.
The monitoring of a firm also can be complicated by tax factors. Col and
Errunza (2013) document lower abnormal returns for shareholders of firms
involved in mergers and acquisitions if a tax haven company is participating.
This effect is especially pronounced if the acquiring tax haven firm underlies a
poor investor protection. Regarding management compensation, Black et al.
(2014) show that compensation increases with the complexity of firms. However,
this relation does not hold if complexity is equivalent to managerial discretion
with a high risk of diversion of resources. Among other factors, the number of
subsidiaries in tax havens specifies the scope of managerial discretion.
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that tax sheltering eases the diversion of
income. Thus, tax avoidance behaviour bears the risk of managerial diversion
of firm's resources. Empirically they show that incentive compensation for man-
agers and good governance of the firm weaken this relation. Desai et al. (2007)
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argue that higher tax rates increase the risk of diversion by controlling share-
holders5. Strong enforcement by tax authorities can be beneficial for outside
shareholders. For a sample of Russian oil companies, they can show that a better
tax enforcement results in higher valuations and lower control premia of firms.
The contribution of this dissertation is twofold: First, it is accounted for the
length of ownership chains. This is another source for complexity, making moni-
toring more costly. The diversion of firm's resources is eased. Second, the system
to avoid international double taxation is identified as a potential driver for firm
complexity.
Tax influences on group structures
Moreover, this dissertation contributes to literature, dealing with tax drivers for
group structures.
The decision, where to allocate the headquarter after a merger, is focused by
Huizinga and Voget (2009). They find empirical evidence that international
double taxation affects the choice, in which country to locate the headquarter
of the combined firm. Firms aim to minimize the tax burden on dividend
repatriations. The paper of Huizinga and Voget (2009) uses a setting, where
firms have to decide between one or the other location. There is also literature
on the general motivation for headquarter relocations.
Voget (2011) finds an increasing probability for relocations if repatriation taxes
are raised by the home country. In the U.S., waves of corporate inversions are
documented, in which U.S. firms initiate mergers to relocate their headquarters.
Desai and Hines (2002) examine corporate inversions for a sample of 24 U.S.
firms taking place in the years 1982 to 2002. Their findings suggest that
inversions are motivated by tax savings on non-U.S. income.6 Seida and Wempe
5In their model, the expropriation of minority shareholders goes along with tax evasion.
6Besides, there exists literature examining effects on firm value by inversions, as done by e.g.
Cloyd et al. (2003).
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(2004) document a substantial decline in ETRs for firms after inversions.
The decision, where to locate subsidiaries, is considered by Buettner and Ruf
(2007). They find effects for the statutory tax rate, the market size and labor
cost. These factors have influence on the decision whether to establish a
subsidiary in a specific country. Barrios et al. (2012) show that repatriation
taxes in the parent country have a negative effect on the probability to establish
a subsidiary in a specific host country. Dyreng et al. (2011) argue that decisions
on the location of subsidiaries are not independent. They observe country pairs
that appear particularly often. These unexpectedly frequent pairs are explained
by interdependent tax characteristics, as for example bilateral treaties or mean
tax burdens.
While the before mentioned literature explains the establishment of subsidiaries
in specific countries, there are some other surveys differentiating for functions of
single subsidiaries within ownership chains.
Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010) analyze a dataset of subsidiaries held by German
parent firms in the year 2002, using a cross-section regression. For profitable
firms, they find a positive relation between taxes withheld in the country of the
subsidiary for dividend repatriations and the probability that the subsidiary is
held via a conduit entity. This result is confirmed for the inbound case. They
find mixed evidence for credit systems resulting in a higher probability of indirect
holdings. Their result, that higher repatriation taxes in the home country reduce
the probability of an indirect holding, contradicts expectations.
Dreßler (2012) uses a panel data set for the years 1996 to 2008 to analyze drivers
for ownership structures. Concerning the influence of withholding taxes, he finds
mixed evidence.
For a sample of U.S. outbound subsidiaries, Lewellen and Robinson (2013) analyze
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characteristics of holding firms. Concerning tax variables, they find that firms
located in tax havens are more likely to be a holding company. The probability to
be used as a holding company decreases if the firm underlies worldwide taxation
or a controlled foreign company rule. Analyzing ownership links, they find that
predominantly specific repatriation strategies are enabled7. High withholding
taxes make a combination of two countries more unlikely, while the existence of
a tax treaty promotes the specific linkage.
The contribution of the third paper is twofold: First, the panel character of the
dataset is used to measure variation over time instead of cross-country variation.
Observing group structures for the years 2005 and 2012 allows to analyze changes
in the regime to avoid international double taxation. Thus, a specific setting
is chosen to estimate the effect of repatriation tax cost, including withholding
taxes, as well as taxes raised by the home country. Second, it is accounted for
the full length of the ownership chain, instead of a classification into directly and
indirectly held subsidiaries. Counting the absolute number of holding companies
allows to test whether group structures become more complex for tax reasons.
7For a discussion of different repatriation strategies please see Altshuler and Grubert (2003).
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3. Databases
As usual for empirical analyses, the core of this dissertation is the underlying
data. The following three papers base on three different databases, which shall
be discussed briefly.
M&A transactions are identified using the Zephyr database, provided by Bureau
van Dijk. This database contains information on the target, the seller and the
acquirer, as well as deal certain characteristics  e.g. dates the deal is announced
and completed, the acquired stake and the value of the deal. Zephyr has a
worldwide coverage. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 contain numbers of deals for the 10 most
frequent target firm's and acquiring firm's countries of residence.
Table 3.1: Zephyr database: Origins of target firms
Country Frequency
United States 15,810
Great Britain 12,112
France 3,092
Germany 2,356
Netherlands 2,235
Canada 2,097
Spain 1,378
Russia 1,289
Sweden 1,120
Finland 1,034
Countries of residence of target
firms. Source: Zephyr database,
2010.
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Table 3.2: Zephyr database: Origins of acquiring firms
Country Frequency
United States 14,356
Great Britain 8,931
France 2,313
Netherlands 1,783
Canada 1,666
Germany 1,615
Spain 1,050
Finland 977
Sweden 975
Russia 751
Countries of residence of acquir-
ing firms. Source: Zephyr data-
base, 2010.
As can be seen, the list of countries for target firms as well as acquiring firms only
differs in the sort order. This is mainly explained by the fact that 72 percent of
deals are reported as domestic, where the acquiring firm and the target firm are
resident in the same country. I verified by hand that Zephyr usually identifies
the immediate acquirer. Thus, in case of an acquisition by a holding company,
this holding company will be reported and not the ultimate owner of the group.
Domestic and cross-border deals can be differentiated based on the countries
of residence of the target firm, the acquirer and the seller of the firm. This
information alone will be imprecise in many cases. Additionally ownership data
will be used, provided by the Amadeus database. Deals, where the target firm and
the acquirer are resident in the same country, are also classified as cross-border
if any subsidiary or owner of the acquiring firm is resident in a third country.
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Information extracted from the Zephyr database is matched to the Amadeus Fi-
nancials database, provided by Bureau van Dijk. The Amadeus database contains
information on firm's balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. Furthermore,
information is available on industry-classifications, firm's activity and legal form.
In all three papers, the sample is reduced to corporations. In the context of merg-
ers and acquisitions, only corporations guarantee that a step up of the tax basis
does not influence financial parameters. Regarding group structures, the relevant
tax planning strategies are based on the separation principle, which applies for
corporations8.
The Amadeus database covers only European countries. Overall, the download
for the years 1996-2009 contains 1,372,755 different firms with 7,048,992 obser-
vations, offering unconsolidated data for all dependent variables used in this dis-
sertation9. Table 3.3 contains the frequencies per year. Numbers of observations
steadily increase over time. This is mainly caused by better data collection and
better data availability in later years10.
Table 3.3: Amadeus database: Frequencies by year
Year Frequency
1996 3,728
1997 6,671
1998 17,824
1999 44,379
Continued on next page
8E.g. tax deferral depends on the delay of home country taxation on repatriated earnings,
which is only given for corporations.
9These are: The effective tax rate, profitability, leverage, the number of employees and total
assets. In fact, the sample is reduced further in each paper, as additional control variables
are afforded. Moreover, information is required for a certain time period before and after
acquisitions.
10For the validity of the data, this would only result in a bias if newly observed firms differ
systematically from old firms in the variables of interest. It is generally assumed that this is
not the case.
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Table 3.3: Amadeus database: Frequencies by year
Year Frequency
2000 206,482
2001 436,670
2002 516,748
2003 627,727
2004 666,240
2005 695,359
2006 849,537
2007 930,251
2008 1,007,674
2009 1,039,702
Numbers of observations by
year. Source: Amadeus data-
base, 2010.
Table 3.4 describes the regional distribution of the database. Unlike the Zephyr
database, the Amadeus database covers especially well southern and eastern Eu-
ropean countries. This is explained by higher disclosure requirements in these
countries. The different distribution results in a large loss of observations after
merging both datasets.
Table 3.4: Amadeus database: Regional covering
Country Frequency
Spain 1,356,147
Russia 1,179,583
Italy 982,640
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4: Amadeus database: Regional covering
Country Frequency
France 517,140
Sweden 433,782
Romania 327,298
Ukraine 308,891
Great Britain 259,785
Belgium 256,051
Czech Republic 172,221
Numbers of observations by
country of residence. The
10 most frequent countries are
listed. Source: Amadeus data-
base, 2010.
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Figure 3.1. ETR, profitability and leverage over time
The following figures will provide an overview of the economic environment in
the full sample. For brevity, only the main variables being used in the following
three papers will be considered. Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the effective
tax rate (ETR), leverage and profitability over time. Effective tax rates fall from
29 percent in 1999 to about 20 percent in 200911. This trend reflects well cuts in
corporate tax rates within this period. Leverage and profitability vary little from
the year 2000 onwards12.
11The ETR is calculated as taxes paid over profit/loss before tax. Values less than 0 and above
1 are truncated to 0 and 1.
12Leverage is calculated as total debt over total assets. Profitability is calculated as earnings
before interest and taxes over total assets. Variables are winsorized at 1 percent to control for
outliers.
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Figure 3.2. ETR, profitability and leverage over time - target firms
Figure 3.2 displays the evolution of the ETR, leverage and profitability for target
firms13. The target firm's effective tax rate shows a stronger decrease compared
to the whole sample. This gives a first hint for a higher level of target firm's
tax avoidance following the acquisition. The time trends for the target firm's
profitability and leverage are quite comparable to the whole sample. Altogether,
target firms show a slightly lower profitability and leverage than the whole sample.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the evolution of the number of employees and total assets
over time. Both variables show an increasing time trend. Between 1996 and 2009,
the mean number of employees increases by about 60 percent from 32 employees
per firm to a mean value of 53 employees. The same trend can be observed for
total assets. Mean total assets increase by about 60 percent, from 7.26 million
USD to 11.6 million USD.
13Only years with more than 100 observations are shown.
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Figure 3.3. Number of employees and total assets over time
Figure 3.4. Number of employees and total assets over time -
target firms
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Figure 3.4 draws graphs for the mean number of employees and total assets for
target firms. Both graphs show the same increasing trend as the whole sample.
Target firms have a noticeably higher number of employees and a higher level of
total assets than the mean firm in the full sample. This finding indicates that
predominantly more mature firms are acquired.
Overall, target firms show time trends comparable to the full sample. Never-
theless, there exists a large variation between firms. The first and the second
paper aim to identify systematic differences in the development of target firms,
following their acquisition. In many acquisitions, tax factors will be of secondary
importance. Despite, it can be shown that tax factors have explanatory power
and will improve the understanding of causes and consequences for mergers and
acquisitions.
Corporate group structures are analyzed using ownership data of the Orbis data-
base, which is provided by Bureau van Dijk. This database contains information
on subsidiaries as well as owners of firms. Based on this information, the complete
ownership structure of groups can be reconstructed. The chain of ownership is
observable for each subsidiary as well as the width of the group.
Ownership data is only provided for the recent year. For this reason, access to
older data is limited. Data is used for the years 2012 and 2005, in this dissertation.
In 2005 the maximum length of a cross-border ownership chain is 9 entities,
meaning that 7 holding companies are interposed between the ultimate owner
and the lowest subsidiary. 44.5 percent of subsidiaries are held directly by the
ultimate owner. Most holding companies are country holdings. Only 12 percent of
subsidiaries are connected to the ultimate owner via at least one holding company
in a third-country. For maximum, holding companies in 3 different third-countries
are included in an ownership chain. 35 percent of groups have only one ownership
chain. The widest group shows 89 different ownership chains. On average, a group
has 3 ownership chains.
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In 2012, the longest ownership chain contains 12 holding companies. 50 percent
of subsidiaries are held directly by the ultimate owner. 11 percent of subsidiaries
are connected via third-country holding companies. In 2012, 40 percent of groups
have only one ownership chain. The widest group has 110 different ownership
chains. The median group has 2 ownership chains.
Between 2005 and 2012, the number of groups with at lest one subsidiary in a
tax-haven country, increased from 9.2 to 13.5 percent14.
So far, only foreign subsidiaries were considered. Domestic structures are much
wider. The median group has 11 purely domestic ownership chains. Thus, do-
mestic operations are much more likely to be split up into different subsidiaries15.
These numbers show that there is variation in ownership structures over time.
The third paper aims to explain this variation by tax factors. Even if there
are many other factors impacting group structures, taxes are a highly significant
factor.
14The definition of tax-haven countries is based on the country list in Hines and Rice (1994).
15Dreßler (2012) explains this finding by group taxation regimes, which enable to net income
over different entities.
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4. Tax avoidance as a driver of mergers and acquisitions?
Tax avoidance as a driver of
mergers and acquisitions?16
16This paper is a joint research project with Martin Ruf (University of Tübingen), Christian
Steffens (University of Mannheim) and Leslie Robinson (Tuck School of Business at Dart-
mouth).
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4.1. Introduction. Mergers and acquisitions are an increasingly important form
of business investment. The value of cross-border deals rose by 53 percent in 2011
to $ 526 billion, compared to cross-border Greenfield investment projects valued
at $ 904 billion during that same year (UNCTAD (2012)). Thus, understanding
the drivers of mergers and acquisitions is a key part of understanding the drivers
of business investment in general.
Mergers and acquisitions take place primarily because of 'ownership advantages'.
Ownership advantages arise when a change in ownership of the target firm is
expected to provide a source of value creation, either by increasing the target's
expected future cash flows or decreasing risk. For instance, the acquirer may
believe that it is able to manage the target better than the seller. Such ownership
advantages are expected to improve future cash flows, enabling the acquirer to
outbid the reservation price of the initial owner and increase the likelihood that
the deal takes place.
There are many possible sources of ownership advantages. While there is an
extensive literature on the change in operating performance following mergers and
acquisitions (see Martynova and Renneboog (2008) for a survey), the potential
importance of tax management has been ignored. Lowering the target firm's
tax burden is one important way that an acquiring firm can generate ownership
advantages. The average firm-level effective tax rate in our sample is around 34
percent, suggesting governments lay claim to one third of pre-tax profits. If the
acquirer believes it is able to minimize the target's taxes more efficiently than
the initial owner, it will expect to generate a higher after-tax cash flow.
We investigate changes in the tax avoidance of targets in a sample of European
mergers and acquisitions taking place between 1996 and 2009, using propensity
score matching to estimate the average treatment effect. As a unique feature of
our analysis we observe operating and financial data of the 'stand-alone' target
firm before and after the deal by using unconsolidated accounting data. Since
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we focus on European mergers and acquisitions the new tax basis of the corpo-
ration's assets post-acquisition is identical to the tax basis of the corporation's
assets pre-acquisition. A step-up in the acquired assets is impossible and cannot
bias our results. This is not true in the United States, since the Section 338
election allows to treat share deals as taxable asset purchases resulting in a step
up. However, regulations comparable to Section 338 are not available in any of
the countries we consider in our sample.
Specifically, we compare three indicators of tax avoidance at the target - effective
tax rate, profitability, and leverage - before and after the deal. Our results gen-
erally show that target tax avoidance improves, resulting in lower tax payments
post deal. Thus, more efficient tax management by acquirers could be a driver
of mergers and acquisitions.
We first examine the potential role of acquirers in target tax avoidance following
both national (acquirer and target are resident in the same country) and interna-
tional (acquirer and target are resident in a different country) deals. The indicator
of tax avoidance that we examine is the target firm's (accounting) effective tax
rate (ETR), or tax expense divided by pre-tax income. This measure reflects tax
management that generates permanent book-tax differences in the target firm.17
We find an average decrease in a target's ETR post-deal of 3 percentage points.
Moreover, this decrease is especially pronounced - around 8 percentage points
- following deals by tax aggressive acquirers having themselves a relatively low
ETR. Thus, acquirers appear to play a significant role in determining the level
of tax avoidance that a target undertakes once it becomes part of the group.
We also examine the potential role of acquirers in target tax avoidance that is only
possible following international deals. While reductions in a target firm's ETR
17Permanent differences arise when a transaction affects taxable income but not book income,
or vice versa. A favorable tax planning strategy would be one that lowers taxable income
without lowering book income.
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imply more efficient tax management at the target firm by the acquirer, ownership
advantages also arise if the target firm enjoys new opportunities to reduce its tax
burden by being part of a multinational group. We examine two prominent
international tax planning strategies - transfer pricing and debt shifting. Here,
we do not focus on the target firm's ETR because these strategies would not
impact such a measure.18
To examine the use of transfer pricing, we investigate changes in target prof-
itability. Consistent with Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) and Clark and Ofek
(1994) we find a decrease in target profitability post deal in general. Splitting
the sample between high tax and low tax targets (targets facing a higher or lower
statutory tax rate than the acquirer, respectively), we find a decrease in prof-
itability only in high tax targets. This result points to international tax planning
(i.e., transfer pricing) by the acquirer contributing to the observed decrease in
target profitability following mergers and acquisitions.
To examine the use of debt shifting, we investigate changes in target leverage.
While we do not find a significant change in target leverage post deal, we find
empirical evidence consistent with use of 'debt push-down' strategies being the
possible reason for this finding. In countries offering group taxation, a promising
tax strategy related to mergers and acquisitions is to load a holding company
with debt in order to acquire the target. As a result, the leverage of the holding
company increases, while the leverage of the target remains unchanged. Group
taxation then allows for consolidation when computing taxable income such that
the interest expense of the holding company offsets the earnings of the target (see
Section 4.4.3 for further discussion).19
18If a multinational firm uses transfer prices or debt shifting to re-allocate target profits to
other members of the group, this affects both the target's book and taxable income. While
these strategies may impact the consolidated ETR of the multinational firm, they will not
impact the individual target firm's ETR.
19See "`Kastljós: Álverin koma sér hjá skattgreiðslum"' by Helgi Seljan, Icelandic National
Television Commentary, March 2013, for a discussion of this strategy in Iceland by large U.S.
multinational firms.
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Our study is related to three distinct strands of literature. First, there is a
growing literature that considers the role of tax avoidance in mergers and acqui-
sitions.20 Kaplan (1989) and Devos et al. (2009) estimate the extent to which tax
savings are responsible for merger gains. Blouin et al. (2005) examine changes
in taxable income of U.S.-domiciled firms after being acquired by foreign firms.
Martin et al. (2012) examine the link between target tax aggressiveness and ac-
quisition premiums. Chow et al. (2013) and Col and Errunza (2013) examine
announcement returns of targets and acquirers to determine whether anticipated
(future) tax avoidance is an underlying source of merger gains. These last two
studies are most closely related to ours, though neither study examines the pre-
cise channel through which tax avoidance occurs post-deal. Our study documents
increased tax avoidance of targets post deal with respect to the target's ETR and
international profit shifting.
Second, there is extensive literature evaluating the operating performance follow-
ing mergers and acquisitions as reviewed in Martynova and Renneboog (2008).
The empirical evidence is mixed  14 out of 26 studies report a post-merger de-
cline in the operating returns of merged firms, 7 papers show insignificant changes
in profitability and only 5 papers provide evidence of a significantly positive in-
crease. Only two studies  Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) and Clark and Ofek
(1994)  focus on the post-merger operating performance of the target as we do.
We find a decrease in target operating performance following takeovers (consis-
tent with their results) and provide tax motivated transfer pricing as a partial
explanation for this finding.
Third, there is a large literature on tax planning, e.g. Chen et al. (2010) with
respect to ETRs, Desai et al. (2004) with respect to international debt shifting
and Huizinga and Laeven (2008) for international transfer pricing. We contribute
20There is also a literature that considers taxes as a source of value creation in mergers and
acquisitions, however, it focuses on taxes at the transaction-level (e.g., Auerbach and Reyshus
(1988b); Erickson, 1998).
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to this literature by using mergers and acquisitions as a new setting in which to
identify tax motivated international profit and debt shifting.
Our study points to the economic importance of tax avoidance as a driver of
mergers and acquisitions. Aside from improving a firm's after-tax profit, effec-
tive tax management may be important for a firm looking to prevent a hostile
takeover. Potential acquirers with more efficient tax management may be able
to competitively bid for target firms. Our results also give rise to tax policy con-
cerns. If some types of tax avoidance are only available to multinational groups
(e.g., transfer pricing), then international acquirers may enjoy an exclusive own-
ership advantage with respect to national targets. As a result tax systems could
force national firms in international takeovers.
Section 4.2 develops testable hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the empirical
methodology and the data. Section 4.4 presents empirical results. Section 4.5
concludes.
4.2. Tax avoidance as a driver of mergers and acquisitions. The initial
owner of a firm will sell the firm if the offer price exceeds his reservation price (see
Hansen (1987)). The initial owner's reservation price is equal to the capitalized
earnings value x
r
of the expected cash x from keeping the firm, where r is the
discount rate. The expected cash x? of a potential acquirer may differ due to non-
tax reasons (e.g. synergies, see Weston et al. (2004), pp. 130, for potential non
tax reasons of such differences) or due to tax reasons. Regardless of the reasons,
if a potential acquirer expects to generate a greater cash flow from owning the
firm than the initial owner (x? > x) he has an ownership advantage (see Becker
and Fuest (2010); Desai and Hines (2003)). The resulting capitalized earnings
value of the acquirer is x
?
r
, the maximum offer price the acquirer is willing to bid.
If a potential acquirer has an ownership advantage the offer price of the acquirer
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exceeds the reservation price of the initial owner, implying that the deal will take
place when x
?
r
> x
r
.
There are several economically significant tax reasons that a potential acquirer
would expect higher cash flows than those generated by the initial owner. First,
both national and international deals may provide an acquirer with the ability to
lower a target's ETR through more effective tax management at the level of the
target itself. Second, in the case of international deals, an acquirer may be able
to re-allocate the income of a target facing a relatively high tax rate to another
member of the multinational group where the income is taxed at a lower rate.
This is typically accomplished through transfer pricing or debt shifting. We next
describe each measure of tax avoidance in turn.
4.2.1. Effective Tax Rate (ETR). Accounting ETRs are widely employed to mea-
sure the tax avoidance of firms (see summary provided in Hanlon and Heitzman
(2010) and as examples the studies of Chen et al. (2010); Dyreng et al. (2010);
Phillips (2003); Rego (2003); Mills et al. (1998)).21 An accounting ETR is im-
pacted by tax planning strategies that generate permanent book-tax differences.
Examples (see Chen et al. (2010)) of such tax planning are investments in tax-
exempt or tax-favored assets, participation in tax shelters that give rise to losses
for tax purposes but not for book purposes, the use of tax credits or the use
of favorable depreciation schemes available for tax purposes only. Scholes et al.
(2009), pp. 39-40, provide a comprehensive overview of possible book-tax dif-
ferences. Moreover, we rely on a three-period average measure to mitigate the
effects of transitory changes in annual ETRs.22 Such tax avoidance is possible
21Our ETR measure comes from Amadeus (see Section 3.1 for a discussion of our data source)
and is defined as tax expense (TAXA) divided by pre-tax book income (PLBT).
22DyrengHanlonMaydew2008 and Klassen and LapLante (2012) recognize that multi-year mea-
sures of ETRs are an improvement over single year measures. We settle on a three-year measure
in our study to avoid a significant reduction in our sample size though, in some analyses, those
authors consider longer periods.
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for national as well as multinational firms. If a target's tax avoidance improves
after an acquisition, we expect to observe a drop in the target's ETR.
If the target's effective tax rate ETR? post-deal is lower than the target's ETR
pre-acquisition, and a potential acquirer and initial owner are equally capable
of generating the same pre-tax book income (denoted BI) at the level of the
target, then the expected after-tax cash flow for a potential acquirer is x? =
(1− ETR?)BI and for the initial owner is x = (1− ETR)BI. Due to the lower
ETR (ETR? < ETR) the deal will take place because x
?
r
= (1−ETR
?)BI
r
> x
r
=
(1−ETR)BI
r
. Empirically, if we find a lower target ETR post deal, then improved
target tax avoidance by the acquirer could be a driver of the deal.
Moreover, acquiring firms differ in their tax aggressiveness. Since acquirers will
benefit from their tax planning experience when restructuring the target's affairs
in a tax efficient manner23, we expect to observe a larger decrease in a target's
ETR following acquisitions by tax aggressive acquirers. We thus differentiate
acquirers with respect to their ETR pre-acquisition. We consider acquirers having
an ETR below the country specific sample average as especially tax aggressive.
4.2.2. Transfer pricing. The ability to set transfer prices on intra-firm trade pro-
vides multinational firms with flexibility as to how to allocate income across na-
tional jurisdictions imposing different tax rates (see Huizinga and Laeven (2008)).
The possibilities to shift profits potentially increase substantially following an in-
ternational deal.24 For instance, firms can alter prices charged on intragroup ser-
vices or deliveries, or even create new intragroup services or deliveries. There is no
data available on intragroup services and deliveries, or their pricing in Amadeus.
23The argument in Dyreng et al. (2010), that top executives have effects on their firms' tax
avoidance, is similar. Also see Chow et al. (2013), Col and Errunza (2013).
24We recognize there may be opportunities to shift profits after a national deal in order to take
advantage of various sub national rates. However, profit shifting is a significant source of tax
savings in multinational firms, and hence, more likely to motivate an international deal.
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So, we follow the literature on tax-motivated transfer pricing and relate a firm's
profitability to its tax incentives to shift income via transfer pricing.
Profit shifting generates tax savings when income is shifted from high-tax loca-
tions to low-tax locations. International deals offer the possibility to shift profits
out of the target's taxing jurisdiction for the first time. The resulting tax savings
of the acquirer may constitute the ownership advantage necessary to acquire the
target. The target's book income is reduced by profits shifted away (PS), while
the book income of another multinational group member offering a lower tax rate
τ ps is increased. If the resulting new capitalized earnings value of the firm is higher
than the reservation price, the deal takes place (x
?
r
= (1−τ)(BI−PS)+(1−τ
ps)PS
r
> x
r
).
First, we compare the effect of national versus international takeovers on a target's
profitability. In order to separate changes in target profitability arising from
transfer pricing (as opposed to debt shifting), we focus on profitability defined
as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over total assets (see Huizinga and
Laeven (2008)). If the opportunity to shift profits out of the target motivated the
deal, we expect to observe a decrease in the target's profitability. This decrease
should be especially pronounced following international deals.
Next, we differentiate with respect to the statutory tax rate of the acquirer versus
the target. If the acquirer faces a lower statutory tax rate than the target,
we expect a decrease in target profitability (if instead the target's tax rate is
lower, the acquirer may locate additional profits which would increase target
profitability). We also examine whether target profitability decreases when any
member of the acquirer's multinational group (and hence new group of the target)
faces a lower statutory rate than the target.
4.2.3. Debt Shifting. Firm owners may choose to finance their operations with
either debt or equity. For tax purposes dividends paid on equity in general do
not lower taxable income, while interest paid on debt is tax deductible. From
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the tax perspective of the debtor, greater interest payments would be expected
to reduce its tax burden. Thus, the use of debt finance at the level of the target
as a debtor is tax advantageous (see Huizinga et al. (2008)).
On the contrary this conclusion may reverse at the level of the creditor. Taxes
due on dividend earnings at the level of the firm owner are frequently lower than
taxes due on interest earnings. Overall the use of debt finance is thus only a
worthwhile policy, if the tax rate on the resulting interest earnings is sufficiently
low or even zero.
Internally25 debt financing a target will not result in a lower ETR but instead
in a reduction of book income and an increase in interest income II available
to the firm owner. If the tax rate on interest income τ i at the level of the
creditor is lower than the firm's statutory tax rate26 τ , the tax load on the firm's
earnings decreases and the resulting new capitalized earnings value of the target
is (1−τ)(BI−II)+(1−τ
i)II
r
. If the new capitalized earnings value of the firm exceeds
the reservation price of the initial owner (x
?
r
= (1−τ)(BI−II)+(1−τ
i)II
r
> x
r
), the deal
will take place.
In a domestic setting the available tax rate on interest income typically is not
lower than the corporate tax rate. On the contrary multinational groups benefit
from the set of available corporate tax rates worldwide in establishing group
members in low tax countries (see Huizinga et al. (2008)), including many zero
taxed tax havens (see Hines and Rice (1994)). Figure 4.1 illustrates the argument.
If a firm uses debt instead of equity to finance its operations, the resulting in-
terest expenses will affect book as well as taxable income. Thus nominator and
25It is easier to illustrate the argument relying on internal debt finance. However, using external
debt financing gives similar results: Replacing equity with external debt finance in the target
allows the acquirer to use the released equity in a tax-favored location instead. This results in
similar tax savings.
26To simplify the argument we assume that book income is equal to taxable income. We can
thus use the firm's statutory tax rate (which is relevant for debt and profit shifting incentives)
in the formulas instead of the ETR.
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Figure 4.1. Debt shifting
denominator of the ETR are likewise affected. The ETR will not or at least
incompletely reflect the use of debt finance. Instead we investigate this issue con-
sidering the change in a target's leverage (total debt over total assets) following
an acquisition.
If a target's tax avoidance improves after an acquisition, we expect to observe
an increase in the target's leverage. This increase should be more pronounced
following international mergers and acquisitions. Then a purely national target
without the opportunity to debt shift income to group members in low tax coun-
tries becomes part of a multinational group due to the acquisition. Within the
group of international mergers & acquisitions we expect to observe an especially
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pronounced increase in the target leverage, if the acquirer or any group member
of the acquirer's multinational group has a lower tax rate than the target.
The latter two channels for tax avoidance following an international deal may give
rise to tax policy concerns. Since in most cases purely national firms or groups
can neither use debt shifting nor transfer pricing to significantly lower their tax
burden (or the costs of doing so are prohibitively high), international acquirers
have a systematic tax driven ownership advantage allowing them to acquire such
targets. This may contribute to the empirical finding of multinational networks
trading at a premium relative to a benchmark portfolio of purely national firms
(see Creal et al. (2013)).
4.3. Empirical Analysis.
4.3.1. Data. We extract all mergers and acquisitions taking place between 1996
and 2009 from the Bureau van Dijk Zephyr database that result in a 100 percent
ownership change in the target firm. We then merge the resulting targets with the
Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database containing unconsolidated financial data for
European firms, allowing us to evaluate changes in the target's ETR, profitability
and leverage both before and after the deal.
We then delete targets with unlimited liability, since such firms are typically
organized as partnerships, leaving as our focus target corporations only. Pursuant
to an acquisition a partnership's assets may be stepped up resulting in higher
depreciation and lower tax payments, possibly distorting our results (see Erickson
and Wang (2000)). In the United States it is possible to structure an acquisition
as an asset deal even if shares in a corporation are acquired following Section 338.
However, this is not the case for our study since we focus on a sample of European
mergers and acquisitions excluding the United States from the sample of target
countries. In none of the target countries in our sample it is possible to structure
a share deal as an asset deal for tax purposes as in the United States (see KPMG
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Taxation of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions and IFBD Country Analysis).
Since we restrict our sample to 100 percent acquisitions of shares in corporations
the new tax basis of the corporation's assets post-acquisition is identical to the
tax basis of the corporation's assets pre-acquisition. A step-up in the acquired
assets is thus impossible and cannot bias our results.
After these steps we are left with 1,440 targets for which we observe financial
statements three years before and one year after the deal. To these we add all
firms available in Amadeus between 1996 and 2009 offering at least five consecu-
tive financial statements as potential matches. We then delete all firms showing
losses, since the tax planning incentives of loss firms are less clear-cut (see De
Simone et al. (2014)). Out of the remaining 1,078 targets only 832 offer informa-
tion on all regressors of the selection equation, thus 832 targets and 1.97 million
potential matches enter the selection equation. Table 4.1 provides descriptive
statistics for all variables used in the selection equation. Out of the 832 tar-
gets entering the selection equation, only 529 offer information on the outcome
variables  the 3-year averages27 of ETR, profitability and leverage after the deal.
Since in some cases, we anticipate especially pronounced changes in tax avoidance
after international deals, we group the mergers and acquisitions in our sample
into national and international. We start with information on the identity and
residence of target, acquirer and vendor from Zephyr as far as available. We then
identify any group members of the vendor or acquirer using the Amadeus owner
database28. This leaves us with the following four cases:
27Thus, we consider only outcomes of targets for which we observe financial statements three
years before and three years after the deal.
28Firms are identified as group members, if the group parent has a total ownership in the firm
exceeding 90 percent. Unfortunately the Amadeus owner database is incomplete and we are
not able to observe all group members of the acquirer and the vendor. We thus may classify
deals erroneously as national in some cases. We use information on the vendor to identify the
group structure of the target, since the Amadeus owner database does not provide historical
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Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Observations Mean S.D. Min. Max.
ETR (av) 1970957 0.3389 0.2174 0 1
Profitability (av) 1970957 0.1029 0.1234 -0.3677 0.6209
Leverage (av) 1970957 0.6835 0.2556 0.0519 1.6924
Cash (av) 1970957 0.1215 0.1414 0.0003 0.6985
High Growth 1970957 0.0728 0.2599 0 1
Log (Total Assets) (av) 1970957 14.3892 1.7631 8.6854 19.0380
Researchintensity (av) 1970957 0.0244 0.0617 0 0.4626
Tangibility (av) 1970957 0.2998 0.2430 0 0.9519
Inventories (av) 1970957 0.2075 0.2164 0 0.9392
Capital Expenditures 1970957 0.0647 0.1746 -0.5195 0.7527
Stocks traded 1970957 81.7410 64.9474 0.0357 367.0436
Log (Laborforce) 1970957 16.6526 0.9648 12.0191 18.1219
Exports 1970957 35.6822 14.3009 24.4148 99.1450
Log (GDP) 1970957 10.0173 0.5089 8.4713 10.8961
Spending on Education 1970957 4.7327 0.9647 2.4002 7.6359
Inflationrate 1970957 0.0440 0.0452 -0.0113 0.4567
For the definition and the sources of the variables see the appendix.
(1) International - International (target belonging to an international group was
acquired by an international group); (2) National - National (stand-alone target
or target belonging to a national group was acquired by a stand-alone acquirer
or by a national group); (3) National - International (stand-alone target or tar-
get belonging to a national group was acquired by an international group); (4)
International - National (target belonging to an international group was acquired
by a stand-alone acquirer or a national group).
In case (1) and case (2) following our arguments in section 4.2 there is no change
in tax incentives with respect to transfer pricing or debt shifting. Since case (2)
is by far more frequent, we classify this kind of deals as national. In case (3)
we expect increased tax incentives for transfer pricing and debt shifting. We
classify these deals as internationals. Finally in case (4) we expect decreased tax
ownership data. Group members of the target identified using the Amadeus owner database
are members of the new group established following the acquisition of the target.
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incentives. However, since we observe only 19 deals of this type we ignore case
(4) for the empirical analysis.
Figure 4.2 gives an overview of the regional origin of acquirers in our sample.
By far the most acquirers come from the U.K. Interestingly, U.S. acquirers are
important, even though we consider a sample of European targets only. This is
consistent with other studies on international mergers and acquisitions, where
typically the U.S. and the U.K. are the countries with the most acquirers (see
e.g. Huizinga and Voget (2009)).
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4.3.2. Econometric Approach. If we observe a change in any of our variables of
interest (ETR, leverage or profitability) after a deal, we would like to attribute
those changes to changes in target tax avoidance carried out by the acquirer. To
rule out the possibility that the change would have otherwise occurred requires
a counterfactual framework. That is, we observe the change in our variables of
interest after the deal and we would like to compare this to the change, if the
deal had not taken place. Since it is not possible to observe this counterfactual
outcome, we employ propensity score matching to construct a counterfactual
control group.
The idea of propensity score matching is to identify firms being ideally identical
to the target firms besides for the fact of not being sold. This is an econometric
effort to replicate as close as possible the laboratory conditions available in natural
sciences: There is a population of identical examination units out of which one
part receives a treatment and the others not. The observed difference in the
outcome variables of interest is then due to the treatment. The treatment in
question here is the sale of the target firm.
Matching based on the propensity score works in two steps (see e.g. Wooldridge
(2002), Chapter 18). First, we run a probit regression evaluating the probabil-
ity to become a target conditional on a vector of observed covariates (selection
equation). Based on the regression results we predict the probability to become
a target for each firm in our sample.
Second, there are four matching methods (nearest neighbor matching, radius
matching, caliper matching and kernel matching) available in order to match each
treated firm with one or several control firms using the results of the selection
equation. The idea is to match each target with a non-sold firm having the same
probability of becoming a target based on the results of the selection equation.
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Nearest neighbor matching matches to each treated firm the control firm with
the closest propensity score. Caliper matching is a variation of nearest neighbor
matching. It matches treatment firms with control firms only if the propensity
score of both firms is within a predefined radius. By imposing a maximum tol-
erance level of the distance between treated and control firms, caliper matching
attempts to improve the overall matching quality. Instead of matching 1 of the
treated firms with its closest control firm within a radius, radius matching se-
lects all the firms that fall within the predefined caliper. Kernel matching uses
all available controls as matches, but uses weights inversely proportional to the
distance between the propensity scores of treated firms and available controls. In
order to make use of our large set of potential matches, we focus primarily on
radius and kernel matching.
For a given propensity score, exposure to treatment is supposed to be random and
therefore treated and control units should be on average observationally identical.
We check this balancing property and compare the difference in the regressors
of the selection equation between the sold (treatment group) and the non-sold
(control group) firms. If the balancing property holds, the difference in these
regressors should be considerably smaller after matching than before. Since we
control for all variables typically employed for predicting targets in the literature,
we expect to fulfill this condition.
Formally (see Wooldridge (2002), pp. 604-621), we are interested in measuring
the average treatment effect of the treated ATT1 = E(y1−y0 | w = 1). y1 denotes
the outcome (in our case the change in the ETR, the leverage or the profitability)
with treatment and y0 the outcome without treatment. w is a binary variable
indicating participation (w = 1) in treatment (in our case being acquired) or not
(w = 0).
A simple approach to estimate ATT1 would be to compare the mean of the
outcome variable between sold and non-sold firms. However, such an approach is
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only possible if there is no self-selection into treatment: E(y1 | w = 1) = E(y1)
and E(y0 | w = 0) = E(y0). Self-selection into treatment in our case could
e.g. occur if firms having a low leverage or a high ETR are especially attractive
targets. Starting from low leverage an increase in leverage is more likely to occur.
Equivalently starting from a high ETR a decrease is more likely to occur. Then
the observed change is not actually due to treatment but instead due to specific
firms selecting into treatment. It is thus crucial that we eliminate this possibility
to interpret our results.
While due to self-selection mean independence typically does not hold (E(y1 |
w = 1) 6= E(y1) and E(y0 | w = 0) 6= E(y0)), the core idea of matching is
to assume mean independence conditional on a vector of covariates x: E(y1 |
w = 1,x) = E(y1) and E(y0 | w = 0,x) = E(y0). If selection into treatment is
determined by the covariates x, then controlling for these covariates allows for a
meaningful comparison of outcomes between treated and non-treated firms.
We follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and predict the likelihood of being a
target using a probit regression (selection equation) for all firms in our sample.
The predicted probability for being acquired (the propensity score) is then the
basis for finding actual targets versus non-targets with statistically identical co-
variates x. The balancing property shows whether this procedure is successful or
not.
Table 4.2 presents the results of the selection equation and the variables appearing
in the model are defined in the Appendix. We use a probit estimation where the
dependent variable is 1 if a firm becomes a target and zero otherwise. Targets
involved in international deals could systematically differ from targets involved in
national deals. We thus consider international and national takeovers as separate
treatments. The matching procedure then guarantees the comparability between
targets and matches irrespective of their involvement in international or national
takeovers. In the second column and third column of Table 4.2 we present the
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respective probit regression results. Similarly, we consider the takeovers of tax
aggressive vs. non-tax aggressive acquirers as separate treatments.
In the selection equation we use a profitability measure to proxy for a firm's
management efficiency as proposed in Palepu (1986). Profitability is earnings
before interest and taxes (EBIT) over total assets and has a positive effect on
takeover probability. Further we follow Palepu (1986) in using the log of total
assets as a measure for the size of the firm. We find an increase in the likelihood
to become a target with size.
Following Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) we use the firm's leverage (total debt
over total assets) and capital expenditures (change over three periods in fixed
assets over total assets) as controls. While Dietrich and Sorensen find no signif-
icant effects for these controls, we find leverage to have a positive, and capital
expenditures to have a negative, effect on takeover probability. We further find
a firm's cash holdings as a share of total assets to have a negative effect.
High growth is a dummy for firms with an above sample mean increase over
three periods in total assets and affects takeover positively. Research intensity
is intangible assets over total assets and only affects the international takeover
probability. Tangibility defined as fixed assets over total assets has a negative
effect. In addition we use inventories as a share of total assets as an indicator for
firms active in trade, and find a negative effect. We include a dummy for listed
firms, since listed firms may be more difficult to acquire.
All target specific controls besides for high growth and capital expenditures enter
as the average over the three years preceding the takeover and are marked by
(avg.). Thus the value of the controls should not yet be influenced by the takeover.
We control for the target's macroeconomic environment (see Erel et al. (2012))
using stocks traded, log labor force, target country exports, log GDP, spending
on education and the inflation rate. All macroeconomic controls are lagged.
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We additionally control for the effective tax rate (ETR), but we do not find a
significant effect. In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, we use country,
industry and time specific effects.
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Table 4.2. Selection equation
Independent variable All International National
ETR (av) -0.098 -0.045 -0.108
(-1.34) (-0.43) (-1.14)
Profitability (av) 0.502 *** 0.742 *** 0.168
(4.84) (5.61) (1.11)
Leverage (av) 0.073 0.082 0.032
(1.61) (1.34) (0.51)
Cash (av) -0.156 * -0.191 * -0.117
(-1.88) (-1.77) (-1.02)
High Growth 0.100 ** 0.050 0.155 **
(2.26) (0.86) (2.52)
Log (Total Assets) (av) 0.150 *** 0.147 *** 0.128 ***
(23.29) (17.07) (14.75)
Researchintensity (av) 0.280 ** 0.375 ** 0.208
(1.98) (2.07) (1.08)
Tangibility (av) -0.217 *** -0.334 *** -0.095
(-4.29) (-4.93) (-1.40)
Inventories (av) -0.303 *** -0.316 *** -0.248 ***
(-4.29) (-3.50) (-2.93)
Capital Expenditures -0.293 *** -0.156 * -0.368 ***
(-4.67) (-1.88) (-4.34)
Listed -0.458 *** -0.549 ** -0.650 **
(-2.95) (-1.98) (-2.30)
Stocks traded 0.001 *** 0.001 * 0.001 *
(2.66) (1.93) (1.94)
Log (Laborforce) 2.392 *** 3.264 *** 1.345
(3.22) (3.21) (1.33)
Exports 0.021 ** 0.021 0.019 *
(2.25) (1.48) (1.78)
Log (GDP) 1.141 *** 0.618 1.330 ***
(3.35) (1.23) (2.96)
Spending on Education 0.036 -0.008 0.052
(0.55) (-0.10) (0.51)
Inflationrate -2.904 *** -4.326 *** -1.197
(-3.12) (-3.40) (-0.88)
Country Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,970,957 1,896,339 1,951,755
PseudoR2 0.1325 0.1338 0.1183
Note: Results from probit regressions. The dependent variable is 1 if a firm
becomes a target and zero otherwise in the column labeled 'All'. The dependent
variable is 1 if a firm becomes a target due to an international takeover and zero
otherwise in the column labeled 'International'. The dependent variable is 1 if
a firm becomes a target due to a national takeover and zero otherwise in the
column labeled 'National'. For the definition and the sources of the variables
see the Appendix. T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses.
The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively.
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Table 4.3 shows the balancing property based on radius matching taking all deals
as treatments. Through the matching we achieve a significant reduction in bias.
Thus, we believe the matching procedure works fairly well in our case.
Table 4.3. Balancing property - All
Mean Bias reduc- t-test
Variable Treated Control Bias % tion in % t-value p-value
ETR (av) 0.284 0.283 0.5 98.4 0.09 0.924
Profitability (av) 0.103 0.113 -7.6 -352.6 -1.25 0.213
Leverage (av) 0.646 0.640 2.7 83.5 0.44 0.661
Cash (av) 0.115 0.127 -8.5 -251.8 -1.33 0.184
High Growth 0.165 0.166 -0.4 98.0 -0.06 0.950
Log (Total Assets) (av) 15.952 15.760 11.6 88.6 1.92 0.055 *
Researchintensity (av) 0.030 0.027 3.8 52.9 0.57 0.571
Tangibility (av) 0.350 0.335 5.9 69.3 0.93 0.352
Inventories (av) 0.153 0.153 -0.1 99.5 -0.03 0.979
Capital Expenditures 0.044 0.051 -3.6 74.7 -0.55 0.579
Listed 0.006 0.006 -0.6 -195.5 -0.09 0.927
Stocks traded 80.994 82.158 -2.1 92.0 -0.33 0.744
Log (Laborforce) 16.182 16.175 0.7 98.4 0.10 0.920
Exports 39.14 39.637 -3.2 87.5 -0.47 0.636
Log (GDP) 10.108 10.114 -1.3 96.0 -0.25 0.806
Spending on Education 5.415 5.439 -2.2 96.3 -0.33 0.744
Inflationrate 0.027 0.027 0.6 98.8 0.12 0.902
4.4. Results.
4.4.1. Descriptive Evidence. We start by providing some descriptive evidence on
changes in indicators of a target's tax avoidance behavior following a takeover.
Figure 4.3 shows the evolution of the mean target ETRs (defined as tax expense
divided by pre-tax income) starting from five periods pre-deal to five periods post-
deal.29 Zero is defined as the point of time where the deal is completed. Pre-deal
29For calculating the mean target ETR we consider all target observations available. The mean
is thus based on fewer observations e.g. for the period five pre deal. We do not show the 3-year
average here, because e.g. the period -1 result would already be affected by the deal.
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Figure 4.3. ETR pre and post deal
the ETR fluctuates around 28 percent. Post-deal the level of the ETR decreases
and fluctuates around 20 percent. This holds for both national (solid green line)
and international (dashed red line) mergers and acquisitions. Figure 4.3 provides
some evidence for a decreased ETR following mergers and acquisitions.
Figure 4.4 shows in the same manner the evolution of target profitability (defined
as earnings before interest and taxes over total assets) starting from five periods
pre-deal to five periods post-deal. There is some initial evidence for a drop
following the acquisition at point of time zero. This holds for national as well as
international mergers and acquisitions. Target profitability fluctuates around 9
percent pre-deal and 5 percent post-deal.
Figure 4.5 shows the evolution of target leverage (defined as total debt over
total assets). Target leverage decreases steadily from five periods pre-deal to five
periods post-deal for international mergers and acquisitions. There is no clear
trend for national takeovers.
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Figure 4.4. Target profitability pre and post deal
Figure 4.5. Target leverage pre and post deal
All these figures provide suggestive evidence on the evolution of a target's ETR,
profitability and leverage post-deal. However, it is not possible to conclude on
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mergers and acquisitions being causal for the observed evolution. It may well be
the case that the observed evolution of a target's ETR, profitability and lever-
age post-deal would have occurred irrespective of the target being sold to a new
owner. To interpret such a causal relationship we employ more sophisticated
econometrics as described above in section 4.3.2. Using propensity score match-
ing, we separate the change post-deal of a target's ETR, profitability and leverage
caused by mergers and acquisitions from the change that most likely would have
occurred irrespective of the transaction.
Since we include the average effective tax rate in the selection equation, the
starting level of the ETR is identical for targets and non-targets as a result of the
matching procedure as reported in table 4.3. The reported coefficients in table
4.4 and 4.5 of the average treatment effect on the treated are thus equivalent to
the average treatment effect on the treated with respect to the change in ETR
(comparing the average pre- and post-deal level). The same argument holds for
the other outcome variables in tables 4.6 to 4.11.
4.4.2. Main results. Table 4.4 shows the average effect of treatment on a target's
average ETR in the three years following the takeover based on propensity score
matching. Comparing targets and similar non-targets, we find a decrease in the
ETR. This result holds irrespective of the matching algorithm  radius or kernel 
and irrespective of whether treatment is defined as all, only international or only
national takeovers. The reduction is around 3 percentage points for all takeovers.
A target's tax avoidance increases post-deal. The resulting reduction in tax
payments is able to generate an ownership advantage. The observed decrease
of the ETR cannot be due to a step up of the target's assets, since we focus
exclusively on corporations as targets. If at all with corporations as targets a
step up should occur with respect to the shares at the level of the shareholder
(see Erickson and Wang (2000)), which would not affect the ETR.
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Table 4.4. Average effective tax rate
Matching algorithm All International National
Radius -0.030 *** -0.032 *** -0.025 **
(-4.30) (-3.27) (-2.52)
Kernel -0.037 *** -0.049 *** -0.042 ***
(-5.23) (-4.94) (-4.18)
Number of Treated 529 249 262
Number of Untreated 1,180,076 1,142,988 1,169,431
Note: We report coefficients that correspond to the average treatment effect
on the treated (ATT); T-statistics in parentheses. The outcome variable av-
erage effective tax rate (ETR) is defined as a firm's average ETR in the three
years following the takeover. Since we include the average effective tax rate
in the selection equation, the starting level of the ETR is identical for targets
and non-targets. The reported coefficients of the average treatment effect on
the treated are thus equivalent to the average treatment effect on the treated
with respect to the change in ETR (comparing the average pre- and post-deal
level). The 'All' column reports the coefficient based on the selection equation
in Table 4.2 that considers all takeovers as treatments, the 'International' col-
umn reports the coefficient based on the selection equation in Table 4.2 that
considers only international takeovers as treatments, and the 'National' col-
umn reports the coefficient based on the selection equation in Table 4.2 that
considers only national takeovers as treatments. The symbols ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Table 4.5 presents the average effect of treatment on a target's average ETR in the
three years following the takeover, depending on the acquirer's tax aggressiveness.
Tax aggressive acquirers are acquirers with a 3-year mean ETR below the acquirer
country specific sample 3-year mean ETR in the same time period. We find a
larger decrease in a target's ETR following an acquisition by a tax aggressive
acquirer. While the decrease is around 8 percentage points (radius matching)
or even 10 percentage points (kernel matching) following an acquisition by a
tax aggressive acquirer, it is insignificant following an acquisition by a non-tax
aggressive acquirer in the case of radius matching and only around 4 percentage
points in the case of kernel matching. Acquirers appear to use their tax planning
expertise to restructure the target's affairs in a tax efficient manner.
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Table 4.5. Average effective tax rate - tax vs. non tax aggressive acquirer
Matching algorithm Tax aggressive acquirer Non tax aggressive acquirer
Radius -0.075 *** -0.012
(-3.09) (-0.56)
Kernel -0.104 *** -0.040 *
(-4.29) (-1.84)
Number of Treated 50 57
Number of Untreated 1,091,839 1,107,403
Note: We report coefficients that correspond to the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT);
T-statistics in parentheses. The outcome variable average effective tax rate (ETR) is defined as
a firm's average ETR in the three years following the takeover. Since we include the average
effective tax rate in the selection equation, the starting level of the ETR is identical for targets
and non-targets. The reported coefficients of the average treatment effect on the treated are
thus equivalent to the average treatment effect on the treated with respect to the change in ETR
(comparing the average pre- and post-deal level). The column tax aggressive acquirer gives the
coefficient considering only takeovers by tax aggressive acquirers as treatments, the column non-tax
aggressive acquirers gives the coefficient considering only takeovers by non-tax aggressive acquirers
as treatments. Tax aggressive acquirers are acquirers with a three-year mean ETR below the
acquirer country specific sample three-year mean ETR in the same time period. The symbols ***,
**, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Table 4.6 presents the results with respect to the change in average target prof-
itability in the three years following the takeover. Consistent with Ravenscraft
and Scherer (1989) and Clark and Ofek (1994) we observe a decrease in tar-
get profitability. However, we do not find a systematic larger decrease following
international takeovers as we would expect from a tax perspective.
Thus, we further differentiate takeovers with respect to the relative tax rates of
the target versus the acquirer in Table 4.7. Targets facing a higher statutory tax
rate relative to their acquirer are high-tax targets, and they are low-tax targets
otherwise. Only in the case of a high-tax target is shifting profits out of the
target an advisable strategy for the acquirer. Consistent with this expectation,
we observe a decrease in target profitability for high-tax targets, while we do not
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Table 4.6. Average profitability
Matching algorithm All International National
Radius -0.015 *** -0.018 ** -0.012 **
(-2.73) (-2.08) (-1.67)
Kernel -0.014 ** -0.015 * -0.010
(-2.50) (-1.70) (-1.42)
Number of Treated 530 249 262
Number of Untreated 1,180,076 1,142,988 1,169,693
Note: We report coefficients that correspond to the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT); T-statistics in parentheses. The outcome variable average
profitability is defined as a firm's average EBIT over total assets in the three
years following the takeover. Since we include average profitability in the selec-
tion equation, the starting level of average profitability is identical for targets
and non-targets. The reported coefficients of the average treatment effect on
the treated are thus equivalent to the average treatment effect on the treated
with respect to the change in average profitability (comparing the average pre-
and post-deal level). The 'All' column results are based on the selection equa-
tion in Table 4.2 that considers all takeovers as treatments, the 'International'
column results are based on the selection equation in Table 4.2 that considers
only international takeovers as treatments, and the 'National' column results
are based on the selection equation in Table 4.2 that considers only national
takeovers as treatments. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
find any significant change for low-tax targets. Finally, acquirers do not appear
to shift profits into low-tax targets.30
Table 4.8 alternately uses information on the acquirer's group structure obtained
from the Amadeus owner database to differentiate between high-tax targets and
low-tax targets. Targets having a statutory tax rate above the minimum tax rate
faced by any member of the acquirer's group are now defined as high-tax targets.
They are low-tax targets otherwise. Again, we find a significant decrease in
target profitability for high-tax targets only. For legal (e.g. because of controlled
foreign corporation rules) as well as practical reasons (e.g. because of established
30This result may also be due to noise in the data. We precisely identify the group of high
tax targets. However, due to incomplete information on the acquirer's group structure we may
erroneously classify targets as low tax. This makes the correct identification of tax planning
more difficult in this case.
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Table 4.7. High tax and low tax targets
Matching algorithm High tax Low tax
Average profitability
Radius -0.052 *** -0.006
(-3.59) (-0.60)
Kernel -0.047 *** -0.003
(-3.27) (-0.33)
Number of Treated 65 184
Number of Untreated 1,142,988 1,142,988
Average leverage
Radius 0.045 * 0.030 *
(1.77) (1.72)
Kernel 0.027 0.017
(1.06) (0.92)
Number of Treated 65 184
Number of Untreated 1,142,988 1,142,988
Note: We report coefficients that correspond to the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT);
T-statistics in parentheses. The outcome variable average profitability is defined as a firm's average
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over total assets in the three years following the takeover.
The outcome variable average leverage is defined as a firm's average total liabilities over total assets
in the three years following the takeover. Since we include average profitability and average leverage
in the selection equation, the starting level of average profitability and average leverage is identical
for targets and non-targets. The reported coefficients of the average treatment effect on the treated
are thus equivalent to the average treatment effect on the treated with respect to the change in
average profitability and average leverage (comparing the average pre- and post-deal level). The
column high tax gives the results for high tax targets, the column low tax the results for low tax
targets. Targets having a statutory rate above the acquirer's tax rate are defined as high tax
targets. They are low tax targets otherwise. Results are based on the selection equation in Table
4.2 that considers all takeovers as treatments. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
business relationships between the acquirer and the target) it is easier to shift
profits from the target to the acquirer directly instead of shifting profits to a
low-tax group member of the acquirer. We thus observe a lower point estimate
for the decrease in profitability in table 4.8 compared to table 4.7.
Table 4.9 finally presents the results with respect to changes in the 3-year aver-
age leverage in the years following the takeover. While we find some evidence
for an increase in leverage based for all deals, we do not find a systematically
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Table 4.8. High tax and low tax targets  minimum statutory
tax rate of the group
Matching algorithm High tax Low tax
Average profitability
Radius -0.027 *** -0.007
(-2.67) (-0.53)
Kernel -0.024 ** -0.004
(-2.33) (-0.32)
Number of Treated 130 119
Number of Untreated 1,142,988 1,142,988
Average leverage
Radius 0.027 0.041*
(1.50) (1.79)
Kernel 0.008 0.030
(0.48) (1.32)
Number of Treated 130 119
Number of Untreated 1,142,988 1,142,988
Note: We report coefficients that correspond to the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT);
T-statistics in parentheses. The outcome variable average profitability is defined as a firm's average
EBIT over total assets in the three years following the takeover. The outcome variable average
leverage is defined as a firm's average total liabilities over total assets in the three years following the
takeover. Since we include average profitability and average leverage in the selection equation, the
starting level of average profitability and average leverage is identical for targets and non-targets.
The reported coefficients of the average treatment effect on the treated are thus equivalent to the
average treatment effect on the treated with respect to the change in average profitability and
average leverage (comparing the average pre- and post-deal level). The column high tax gives the
results for high tax targets, the column low tax the results for low tax targets. Targets having a
statutory tax rate above the acquirer's group minimum tax rate are defined as high tax targets.
They are low tax targets otherwise. Results are based on the selection equation in Table 4.2 that
considers all takeovers as treatments. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01,
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
larger increase following international takeovers, as we would expect from a tax
perspective. We neither find significant changes if we differentiate between high
tax and low tax targets as in table 4.7. Thus, table 4.9 provides no evidence for
a tax-motivated increase in target leverage.
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Table 4.9. Average leverage
Matching algorithm All International National
Radius 0.031 *** 0.034 ** 0.031 **
(3.02) (2.34) (2.03)
Kernel 0.025 ** 0.019 0.015
(2.42) (1.31) (0.99)
Number of Treated 530 249 262
Number of Untreated 1,180,076 1,142,988 1,169,431
Note: We report coefficients that correspond to the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT); T-statistics in parentheses. The outcome variable average
leverage is defined as a firm's average total liabilities over total assets in the
three years following the takeover. Since we include average leverage in the
selection equation, the starting level of average leverage is identical for targets
and non-targets. The reported coefficients of the average treatment effect on
the treated are thus equivalent to the average treatment effect on the treated
with respect to the change in average leverage (comparing the average pre-
and post-deal level). The 'All' column reports the coefficient based on the
selection equation in Table 4.2 that considers all takeovers as treatments, the
'International' column reports the coefficient based on the selection equation
in Table 4.2 that considers only international takeovers as treatments, and the
'National' column reports the coefficient based on the selection equation in
Table 4.2 that considers only national takeovers as treatments. The symbols
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
4.4.3. Sensitivity analyses.
Group taxation. It is difficult to load a target with additional debt post-deal.
While it is in general possible to load such debt on a target's books, the critical
issue is what to do with the excess liquidity generated in doing so. Raising debt
to finance the deal would be a natural candidate. However, such debt cannot
enter on the books of the target, since these financial means are employed to
acquire the target itself. The only feasible possibility is to distribute the retained
earnings of the target and replace them with debt. This may however cause
taxes on the distributions. Further, pre-deal creditors of the target may oppose
to such a strategy, since it worsens their position in the case of default. Our
results finding no significant change in target leverage post deal indicate that
this strategy is not employed on a large scale due to such costs of debt finance.
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A more tax efficient and widely applied (see Ruf (2011)) strategy is to acquire
targets not directly, but instead via a holding set up in the same country as
the target (debt push-down). Figure 4.6 illustrates such a strategy.31 As the
advantage of this strategy it is possible to load the holding with debt in order
to acquire the target. After the transaction the holding's interest expenses on
the debt to acquire the target are consolidated with the target's earnings making
use of group taxation regimes. The debt of the holding acts as if it were target
debt. This reduces the incentive to load the target with debt itself and could be
an explanation for us not finding clear evidence for an increase in target leverage
following mergers and acquisitions.
In order to test this possibility, we consider targets located in countries offering
no group taxation separately.32 In such countries the debt push down strategy
does not work. Since it is not possible to load an acquiring holding tax efficiently
with debt in such countries, there should be a stronger incentive to load the target
itself with debt.
Indeed  when focusing on targets in countries with no group taxation regime only
 we find evidence for target leverage to increase after the takeover as presented
in Table 4.10. Target leverage increases by around 8 percentage points. Acquirers
loading holdings instead of targets with debt in countries offering group taxation
could thus be an explanation for us finding no effect on target leverage above.
We are not able to split up the results in national and international mergers and
acquisitions in Table 4.10, since the sample of targets in countries without group
taxation regimes is too small to do so.
31See also Delauriere (2011), Brincker (2008), and
http://www.mondaq.com/x/539/Audit/Dutch+Debtpushdown+Structures for a discussion of
the use of debt push-down structures.
32In our sample these are (101) targets located in Belgium (60), Bulgaria (5), Czech Republic
(14), Estonia (5), Lithuania (4), Romania (10) and Slovakia (3).
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Figure 4.6. Debt push down
Table 4.10. Average leverage - countries without group taxation
regime only
Radius 0.082 ***
(3.32)
Kernel 0.075 ***
(3.07)
Number of Treated 101
Number of Untreated 166,499
Note: We report coefficients that correspond to the average treat-
ment effect on the treated (ATT); T-statistics in parentheses. The
outcome variable average leverage is defined as a firm's average
total liabilities over total assets in the three years following the
takeover. Since we include average leverage in the selection equa-
tion, the starting level of average leverage is identical for targets
and non-targets. The reported coefficients of the average treat-
ment effect on the treated are thus equivalent to the average treat-
ment effect on the treated with respect to the change in average
leverage (comparing the average pre- and post-deal level). Results
are based on the selection equation in Table 4.2 that considers all
takeovers as treatments and on a sample including only coun-
tries without a group taxation regime. In our sample these are
Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania
and Slovakia. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Exact matching. As a robustness check we employ three exact matching proce-
dures: for countries, for industries and for country-years. We thus only match
targets and controls from the same country in the first case, from the same in-
dustry in the second case and from the same country and year in the third case.
Table 4.11 shows the radius matching results. Results do not materially change
compared to section 4.4.2. We still observe evidence for a decreased ETR follow-
ing mergers and acquisitions. We find some evidence for a decrease in profitability
and an increase in leverage. However, as before we neither find a systematic larger
decrease in profitability nor a larger increase in leverage following international
takeovers as we would expect from a tax perspective.
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Table 4.11. Exact matching
Matching algorithm All International National
Country specific
Average ETR All International National
Radius -0.033 *** -0.036 ** -0.027 *
(-3.26) (-2.54) (-1.83)
Average Profitability All International National
Radius -0.016 ** -0.019 -0.010
(-2.17) (-1.63) (-1.00)
Average Leverage All International National
Radius 0.033 ** 0.031 0.035
(2.24) (1.52) (1.62)
Industry specific
Average ETR All International National
Radius -0.029 *** -0.033 ** -0.025 *
(-2.93) (-2.33) (-1.72)
Average Profitability All International National
Radius -0.014 * -0.018 -0.011
(-1.93) (-1.56) (-1.15)
Average Leverage All International National
Radius 0.032 ** 0.034 0.033
(2.17) (1.62) (1.53)
Country-year specific
Average ETR All International National
Radius -0.032 *** -0.036 ** -0.027 *
(-3.18) (-2.50) (-1.89)
Average Profitability All International National
Radius -0.016 ** -0.016 -0.011
(-2.08) (-1.39) (-1.10)
Average Leverage All International National
Radius 0.032 ** 0.032 0.035
(2.20) (1.55) (1.61)
Note: We report coefficients that correspond to the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT); T-statistics in parentheses. Results are propensity score matching results after exact
matching according to country, industry or country-year. The outcome variable average ETR
is defined as a firm's average ETR in the three years following the takeover. The outcome
variable average profitability is defined as a firm's average EBIT over total assets in the three
years following the takeover. The outcome variable average leverage is defined as a firm's
average total liabilities over total assets in the three years following the takeover. Since we
include all outcome variables in the selection equation, the starting level of outcome variables
is identical for targets and non-targets. The reported coefficients of the average treatment
effect on the treated are thus equivalent to the average treatment effect on the treated with
respect to the change in outcome variables (comparing the average pre- and post-deal level).
The 'All' column results are based on the selection equation in Table 4.2 that considers
all takeovers as treatments, the 'International' column results are based on the selection
equation in Table 4.2 that considers only international takeovers as treatments, and the
'National' column results are based on the selection equation in Table 4.2 that considers
only national takeovers as treatments. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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4.5. Conclusions. More tax avoidance within targets post-acquisition increases
the cash flow available to acquirers, allowing acquirers to outbid initial owners.
Tax avoidance is one possible driver of mergers and acquisitions. We investigate
the change in the tax avoidance of targets post-acquisition using a sample of
European mergers and acquisitions taking place between 1996 and 2009.
We consider three aspects of tax avoidance: First, a target's effective tax rate
(ETR) as a measure reflecting aggressive tax planning through permanent book-
tax differences; second, target profitability as a proxy to measure tax induced
profit shifting; third, target leverage as an indicator for tax induced debt shifting.
A target's ETR decreases by 3-percentage points post deal and even by 8 per-
centage points if the acquirer is particularly tax aggressive. Further target prof-
itability decreases following mergers and acquisitions. This decrease is especially
pronounced for targets having a higher statutory tax rate than the acquirer. Tax
induced profit shifting is one explanation for the empirical finding of decreased
target profitability.
We do not find evidence for changes in target leverage post deal in general.
However, we find empirical evidence for group taxation being an explanation
for this finding: Restricting our sample to targets from countries without group
taxation regimes results in a significant increase in leverage post deal. In countries
offering group taxation regimes acquirers may prefer to load the acquiring holding
instead of the target itself with debt. This results in similar tax savings, but is
easier to achieve.
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4.7. Appendix.
Table 4.12. Variable definitions
Name Definition
ETR (av) A firm's tax expense (TAXA) divided by pre-tax in-
come (PLBT) (3-year average; for targets defined for the
three years pre-deal (selection equation) and the three
years post-deal (outcome variable)). The ETR is win-
sorized into the (0,1) interval. Source: Bureau van Dijk
Amadeus Database.
Profitability (av) A firm's Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT)/Total
assets (3-year average; for targets defined for the three
years pre-deal (selection equation) and the three years
post-deal (outcome variable)); Source: Bureau Van Dijk
Amadeus Database.
Leverage (av) A firm's Total liabilities/Total assets (3-year average;
for targets defined for the three years pre-deal (selection
equation) and the three years post-deal (outcome vari-
able)). Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database.
Cash (av) A firm's (Cash + Cash equivalents)/Total assets (3-year
average). Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database.
High Growth Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for a firm
whose annual growth rate of 'Total assets' is above the
average growth rate and 0 otherwise.
Log (Total Assets) (av) Natural logarithm of a firm's Total assets (3-year aver-
age). Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database.
Researchintensity (av) A firm's Intangible assets/Total assets (3-year average).
Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database.
Tangibility (av) A firm's Fixed assets/ Total assets (3-year average).
Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database.
Inventories (av) A firm's Inventory/Total assets (3-year average).
Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database.
Capital Expenditures Difference in a firm's fixed assets between one year and
three years preceding the acquisition / Total assets.
Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database.
Listed Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for listed stocks
and 0 otherwise. Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus
Database.
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Name Definition
Stocks traded Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP of the tar-
get country. Source: World Development Indicators,
Worldbank Database.
Log (Laborforce) Total labor force comprises people aged 15 and older
who meet the International Labour Organization def-
inition of the economically active population (loga-
rithm). Source: World Development Indicators, World-
bank Database.
Exports Ratio of Exports of goods and services to GDP of the
target country. Source: World Development Indicators,
Worldbank Database.
Log (GDP) The natural logarithm of the target's country purchase
price parity (ppp) converted GDP per capita. Source:
Penn World Tables.
Spending on Education Ratio of Public expenditure on education to GDP of the
target country. Source: World Development Indicators,
Worldbank Database.
Inflationrate Inflation as measured by the consumer price index of the
target country. Source: World Development Indicators,
Worldbank Database.
Note: All averages (avg.) are calculated for the three years preceding the acquisition. All
macroeconomic variables refer to the year preceding the acquisition. All financial data is win-
sorized at the 1% level.
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5. Effects of tax avoidance on real activity in the target
country following M&A.
Effects of tax avoidance on real
activity in the target country
following M&A.
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5.1. Introduction. Mergers and acquisitions account for about 35 percent of
global foreign direct investment33. For this reason, it is important to understand
consequences and drivers for cross border mergers and acquisitions. Regarding
the ownership of firms, tax systems are neutral if the tax burden is independent
of the firm's owner and not affected by any changes of ownership. In certain
respects, this neutrality is suspected to be violated by taxes: We know that
transaction taxes raise seller prices and result in a lock-in effect34. We also know,
that the reduction of ongoing profit taxes, following mergers and acquisitions,
can result in an ownership advantage. This favours acquirers with a large bunch
of tax planning opportunities. In this sense, multinational firms have access
to an additional dimension of tax planning, compared to purely national firms.
Therefore they are able to reduce a target firm's tax burden after an acquisition.
Using transfer pricing and debt shifting, international tax rate arbitrage can be
realized.35 From the target firm's perspective, new profit shifting opportunities
result in decreasing cost of capital. A positive effect can be expected on the
volume of real activity.
To allocate profits to low tax countries is a well known incentive, not only follow-
ing acquisitions. For decades, politicians have been enacting anti-abuse provisions
to protect their tax base. If those provisions are strict, shifting of pure profits is
restricted or, ideally, vanished. At the same time, cost of capital increase, up to
the initial level of the stand alone target. This compensates the positive effect
on the volume of real activity. Nevertheless, if profits can not be shifted directly,
firms could react by shifting real activity. Thus, connected profits are equally
shifted to low tax countries. If firms are able to react this way, there is still an
ownership advantage for multinational firms.
33Source: UNCTAD (2014).
34Ayers et al. (2003).
35Belz et al. (2013).
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In this paper it is analyzed how the target firm's volume of real activity reacts to
the new tax planning environment as part of a multinational group. Originally
purely domestic firms are tracked after their acquisition by a multinational group.
This allows to compare the situation before the acquisition to the development
of the target firm thereafter, when access to international tax planning is given.
Thereby, variation is exploited in tax incentives of the acquiring group and in
the existence of anti-profit shifting rules in the target countries. Real activity is
measured as the number of employees in the target country as well as the absolute
book value of assets.
Interest deduction barriers and profit shifting regulations are considered as pro-
visions enacted by the target country in this paper. Additionally, the setting
allows to control for the regulatory environment in the country of the acquirer.
The existence of tax incentives to shift profits has to be judged from the acquirer's
perspective. Only from the acquirer's perspective it can be judged whether tax
savings are final. Thus, the method to avoid international double taxation and,
if available, cfc-rules have to be taken into account.
It can be shown, that acquisitions have systematically different effects on the
target firm's volume of real activity. These differences are driven by the tax
environment in the target country as well as in the country where the acquiring
group is resident. The results indicate that the quantity of employees as well as
the volume of total assets in a target country are significantly reduced if profit
shifting is restricted. This effect is increasing with the gap between tax rates
of the target firm and the acquiring group. Furthermore, there is evidence that
this effect is eliminated by controlled foreign company (cfc) rules in the acquiring
firm's country of residence.
Following this introduction, section 2 of the paper develops the testable hypoth-
esis. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and the data. Section 4
presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
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5.2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development. Literature states
that following an acquisition, the acquirer is able to project his own characteris-
tics onto the target firm. Jensen (1984) argues that target companies can benefit
from the higher abilities of the acquiring firm's management. Following this, ac-
quisitions ensure protection against mismanagement of firms. However, there is
found no clear effect of acquisitions on the performance of target firms in liter-
ature36. For specific characteristics, the transfer is well documented. Ahuja and
Katila (2001) as well as Bresman et al. (1999) show that knowledge can be trans-
ferred within the newly formed firm. Erel et al. (2015) show that acquisitions
can diminish financial constraints of the target firm. Concerning tax character-
istics, Belz et al. (2013) analyze tax aggressiveness and tax avoidance behavior
after mergers and acquisitions. The acquiring firm is not only able to bring its
tax aggressiveness down to the target level. They also show that target firms
adjust their tax avoidance behaviour for incentives adhered to the acquirer. The
strongest effect is measured for purely national targets that were acquired by
a multinational firm. Profit shifting and debt shifting are identified as the two
channels for tax avoidance.
When purely national targets are integrated into a multinational group, addi-
tional instruments become accessible for tax avoidance. In comparison to the
situation before the acquisition, cost of capital will decrease after the acquisi-
tion because of new profit shifting opportunities. Other factors being equal, it
is efficient to expand real activity of the target firm from the acquirer's perspec-
tive. The magnitude of this effect depends on the size of the tax advantage. The
conducted empirical analysis in this paper will allow to measure this effect.
In the literature is some evidence that profit-shifting decouples investment deci-
sions from local tax rates. Grubert (2003) finds that research and development
36For an overview see Martynova and Renneboog (2008).
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intensive firms are more likely to invest in extremely high-tax countries and ex-
tremely low-tax countries. He argues that research and development intensive
firms have more profit shifting opportunities. These opportunities lead to a re-
duction of the negative effect of high tax rates on investment. Overesch and
Schreiber (2010) confirm this interpretation. They give evidence that the volume
of investment is independent of the tax rate if firms have a specifically high scope
for profit shifting.
It depends on the regulatory environment within the target country to what
extent international tax planning instruments can be used. As shown by the
literature, profit shifting is primarily achieved by debt shifting as well as transfer
pricing37. The restriction of debt shifting by thin-capitalization rules is analyzed
by Buettner et al. (2012). They find a significant reduction of profit shifting
through debt financing if such a rule applies. The tighter the definition of the
rule is, the higher is the effect of the restriction38. Lohse and Riedel (2012) confirm
this finding also regarding transfer pricing. Defining categories of strictness, they
find out: The stricter the rule is designed in a country, the less profit shifting
through transfer pricing will be observed.
If anti-avoidance rules are strict, cost of capital increase39. The upper limit is
the initial level of the stand-alone target firm if profit shifting is fully eliminated.
The positive investment effect is removed. Nevertheless, there is an additional
negative effect on real activity.
Before the acquisition, the target firm was purely national. From a tax avoidance
perspective, international tax rate arbitrage is easily accessible. The only pre-
condition is the availability of a relatively low-taxed subsidiary. Consequently, it
37E.g. Desai et al. (2004) regarding debt shifting and Huizinga and Laeven (2008) regarding
transfer pricing. For a further overview over the available literature please see Heckemeyer and
Overesch (2013).
38The definition of tightness is based on the safe haven debt to equity ratio.
39For anti-profit shifting rules as an instrument for tax competition between countries, please
see e.g. Haufler and Runkel (2008) and Paeralta et al. (2006).
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must be a matter of cost why some firms remain purely national. Especially the
specific knowledge for implementing the necessary structure is costly, as well as
more complicated tax declarations and additional documentation requirements.
After the acquisition, the target firm is part of a multinational group. The neces-
sary structure for international tax rate arbitrage is available without bearing cost
of implementation. There is a clear incentive to shift profits within the group. If
shifting of pure profits is not possible, there is a tax incentive to shift existing real
activity as well as future investments, and thus shift the connected profits from
higher to lower taxed subsidiaries. For this reason, an additional negative effect
has to be expected on real activity in the target country. Real activity, which is
not inseparably connected to the target country (local rents), will be shifted if a
tax advantage can be generated. The extent of shifting is growing with the size
of the tax advantage that can be generated by the group.
Empirical evidence is given by Buettner et al. (2014), who analyze the effect of
thin-cap rules and profit shifting regulations on foreign direct investment for a
panel of German multinationals. They find a significantly lower foreign direct
investment and employment associated with thin-cap rules in subsidiary coun-
tries40. Concerning transfer pricing regulations, this effect can not be confirmed
by Buettner et al. (2014).
The following effects are allowed to be measured by tracking former stand-alone
firms after their acquisition by a multinational firm:
- The positive investment effects, caused by new profit shifting opportunities.
- Countervailing negative effects of anti-profit shifting rules.
The incentive to shift real activity within the acquiring group also depends on the
regulatory environment within the acquirer's country of residence. The acquirer
evaluates the profitability of shifting based on the potential increase in after-tax
earnings of the whole group. Thus, the evaluation has to be differentiated by
40Foreign direct investment is measured as property plant and equipment.
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territorial systems and worldwide systems in the aquirer's country of residence.
In a territorial system, tax burdens of each subsidiary are final. There is a clear
incentive to reduce tax burdens in high tax countries and shift taxable income to
low tax countries. However, in a worldwide tax system, taxes being paid within
the subsidiaries' countries are credited against the home country tax rate in case
of repatriation. The final tax burden is independent of any shifting between
differently taxed subsidiaries.
Under certain conditions, groups being taxed by a worldwide system have the
same incentives as those being taxed by an exemption system. Markle (2012)
finds that the difference in the volume of profit shifting vanishes if there is no
pressure to repatriate earnings for multinationals in a worldwide system. Barrios
et al. (2012) show a decrease in the elasticity of location decisions of subsidiaries
to repatriation cost if deferral is possible. Altogether, it is not clear whether
acquirers being taxed by a worldwide system necessarily act differently. For this
reason, acquirers, which are established in a country with a territorial system,
are allowed to have a higher incentive to shift real activity for tax reasons and
thus are analyzed separately.
In a similar way, controlled foreign company rules are intended to affect the
incentive of profit shifting. Again, taxes being paid in subsidiary countries are
credited in case of income being classified as cfc-income, but repatriation is no
precondition for taxation in the home country. Home country taxation arises as
soon as profits are realized. Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013) show evidence that
cfc rules have influence on the allocation of passive assets for a panel of German
multinationals. Passive assets and therefore passive income are mainly allocated
to countries, where cfc rules are no obstacle.41 To analyse the effect of cfc rules,
41Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013) exploit variation in the distribution of passive assets of German
multinationals caused by the Cadburry-Schweppes decision of the European Court of Justice
in 2006.
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the sample in the empirical analysis is split into acquirers that are restricted by
a cfc rule and those acquirers that are not restricted by a cfc rule.
5.2.1. Classification of Profit Shifting Regulations. Real activity will be shifted
if the expected return exceeds expected cost of shifting42. The expected return
depends on the reduction of the effective tax rate that can be realized in the
target country. Therefore, the effective tax rate is compared to the effective tax
rate after shifting.
The target firm's effective tax rate (without shifting of real activity) depends on
the statutory tax rate of the target country as well as the optimum extent of profit
shifting. Buettner et al. (2012) show for debt shifting, Lohse and Riedel (2012)
show for transfer pricing, an increasing reduction of profit shifting, the stricter
the anti avoidance rule is designed. Thus, the smaller the remaining scope for
profit shifting and the higher the expected return of shifting real activity, the
more likely it is for firms to shift.
The designs of thin cap rules as well as of transfer pricing regulations show sub-
stantial similarity among the majority of countries in the dataset. Nevertheless,
there are systematic differences with regard to the strictness of these rules. These
differences are used to define a measure of strictness.
Thin cap rules. Multinational firms have an incentive to finance relatively high
taxed subsidiaries with debt capital. This debt capital is provided by low taxed
subsidiaries of the same group. While the high taxed subsidiary deducts interest
payments from its' tax base, these payments result in taxable interest income at
the low taxed subsidiary. For this reason, tax rate arbitrage can be realized.
In our sample, most of the target countries had or introduced a restriction for the
deduction of interest payments. The majority of countries defines a maximum
42For a more detailed analysis of economic effects please see Luckhaupt et al. (2012)
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debt to equity threshold (safe haven). Up to this threshold interest deduction is
allowed. Above this threshold, a further deduction is not allowed.
Following Buettner et al. (2012), this threshold is transformed into a measure of
strictness in country i for year t:
TC_strictnessi,t =
1
1+ρi,t
,
where ρi,t is the threshold for country i in year t. Originally, ρi,t takes values
between 1.5 (for Germany between 2001 and 2007) and infinite (all cases where
no rule exists); the transformed values are between 0 (no rule exists) and 0.4
(for Germany between 2001 and 2007). The value for TC_strictness increases
with the strictness of the rule. As shown by table 5.1, most variation over time
comes from the introduction of a thin cap rule43. During the observed period,
the threshold was only changed in a small number of countries.
43Among the countries in the dataset these are Bulgaria (1998), Poland (1999), Romania (2002),
Latvia (2003), Italy (2004) and Croatia (2005).
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The definition above does not allow to include values for the Ukraine. In the
Ukraine, interest payments, exceeding interest income, are deductible up to a
certain percentage of the net income before tax. In Germany and Italy a limited
amount of interest payments is deductible from the year 2008 onwards. Rules of
this kind can not be transferred into the measure of strictness without further
assumptions.
In some countries internal debt is only relevant for thin cap rules, implying in-
nocence of external debt. For purposes of this paper, this differentiation is not
relevant. As shown by Desai et al. (2004), internal debt reacts particularly sensi-
tive to tax incentives and, in each case, internal debt is included by the thin cap
rule.
From the acquirer's perspective, the decision to shift real activity is based on the
expected reduction of the group's effective tax rate. Thin cap rules are expected
to result in an increase of the effective tax rate. This concerns profits in the
target country, because shifting of pure profits is restricted. The group's incentive
to shift real activity shall be modelled. For this reason, variables describing the
strictness of thin cap rules have to be related to the tax incentive. Firms will only
perceive thin cap rules as disadvantageous if there is an incentive to shift profits
from the target country to another subsidiary. The higher this incentive is, the
more likely firms are shifting real activity. This tax incentive is specified by the
difference between the target country's statutory tax rate and the lowest available
statutory tax rate within the acquiring group. The variable TC_strictness will
be interacted with this difference in the empirical analysis.
The majority of thin cap rules limits the amount of debt resulting in tax de-
ductible interest payments. It might even be considered to manipulate the inter-
est rate. Such a manipulation of interest rates is ruled out by transfer pricing
regulations.
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Transfer Pricing Regulations. The second major channel for international tax rate
arbitrage is the manipulation of intra-firm transfer prices. There is an incentive
to manipulate the stipulated price regarding transactions within the same group.
The manipulation takes place in a way that the higher taxed firm generates lower
taxable income and the lower taxed firm vice versa. Again, the group is able to
benefit from international tax rate arbitrage.
In the dataset, transfer pricing regulations are even more prevalent than thin
cap rules among countries, as illustrated by table 5.2. The majority of countries
has transfer pricing regulations for the whole period. Only the Ukraine (2001)
and Latvia (2007) introduced a rule. There is a trend to more tightened transfer
pricing regulations in the observed period44.
Transfer pricing regulations are intended to adjust stipulated prices if these dif-
fer from those, which would have been agreed on by independent firms45. This
is the so called arm's length principle. The arm's length principle is substan-
tiated by certain methods to determine the true 'price'. Methods proposed by
the OECD are divided into traditional transaction methods (the comparable un-
controlled price method, the resale price method and the cost plus method) and
into transactional profit methods (the transactional net margin method and the
transactional profit split method).46 All these methods rely on the idea of com-
paring prices either to observable market transactions, or to transactions within
the same firm. Firm specific information is necessary because firm specific factors
influence prices. These factors are the performed function of each participant,
risk-sharing or the economic environment.
Lohse et al. (2012) classify transfer pricing regulations in 6 categories of increasing
strictness, ranging from 0 to 5. Their classification is based on the existence of
transfer pricing regulations, documentation and disclosure requirements. The
44Lohse et al. (2012).
45OECD (2010).
46For further details to the arm's length principle and methods, please see OECD (2010).
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main focus is laid on the requirement for information, becoming available for the
tax authorities. The availability of information is crucial for legal enforcement.
It may be assumed that the requirement for additional information is a good
indicator for the severity of tax authorities and for the remaining scope for price
manipulations.
In the empirical analysis, this classification is used to describe the strictness
of transfer pricing regulations. Whether a strict transfer pricing rule exists is
indicated by a dummy variable Tp_dumi,t. The variable takes the value 1 if
the rule is classified in country i in year t into the categories three to five and
0 otherwise. This definition copes best with the ordinal nature of the chosen
classification. From category three onwards, documentation requirements are
introduced in national tax law. The variable has to be be interacted with the
difference between the statutory tax rate of the target country and the lowest
statutory tax rate being available in the acquiring group.
79
T
a
b
l
e
5
.2
.
S
tr
ic
tn
es
s
of
tr
an
sf
er
p
ri
ci
n
g
re
gu
la
ti
on
s
ov
er
ti
m
e
Y
ea
r
C
ou
n
tr
y
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
B
el
gi
u
m
3.
00
3.
00
3.
00
3.
00
3.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
B
u
lg
ar
ia
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
C
ze
ch
R
ep
u
b
li
c
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
G
er
m
an
y
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
3.
00
3.
00
3.
00
3.
00
3.
00
3.
00
3.
00
E
st
on
ia
0.
00
0.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
S
p
ai
n
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
3.
00
3.
00
3.
00
F
in
la
n
d
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
3.
00
3.
00
4.
00
C
ro
at
ia
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
It
al
y
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
L
at
v
ia
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
P
ol
an
d
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
4.
00
R
om
an
ia
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
3.
00
3.
00
3.
00
S
w
ed
en
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
3.
00
3.
00
3.
00
S
lo
va
k
ia
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
2.
00
3.
00
U
k
ra
in
e
-
-
-
-
-
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
1.
00
St
ri
ct
ne
ss
of
tr
an
sf
er
pr
ic
in
g
re
gu
la
ti
on
s
in
ta
rg
et
co
un
tr
ie
s
ov
er
ti
m
e,
de
fin
it
io
n
fo
llo
w
s
L
oh
se
et
al
.
(2
01
2)
.
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
ti
on
s
ar
e
in
a
ra
ng
e
b
et
w
ee
n
0
(n
o
ru
le
ex
is
ts
)
an
d
5
(v
er
y
st
ri
ct
).
80
Regulatory Environment in the Acquirer's Country. From the acquirer's perspec-
tive, consequences have to be considered for the home country tax base when
deciding for or against the shifting of real activity. A shifting will only take place
if tax advantages are not abolished by a reverse tax effect in the home country.
Such a reverse effect could be expected in a worldwide tax system. In a worldwide
tax system, foreign pre-tax earnings are taxed at the statutory corporate tax
rate in the home country. Taxes paid in the source country are credited against
the resulting home country tax burden. As a result, the possible tax advantage
of shifting is withdrawn by the home country.
Table 5.3 presents an overview over the system to avoid international double
taxation, sorted by acquirer's countries of residence.
The incentive to shift real activity to low-tax subsidiaries could still persist in
a worldwide tax system: First, home country taxation accrues only if foreign
earnings are repatriated. As long as foreign earnings remain abroad, no taxes
become due in the home country. For this reason, multinationals with residence
in worldwide systems can act like multinationals in territorial systems regarding
tax avoidance47. Second, there could be alternative ways to repatriate foreign
earnings without causing repatriation taxes, e.g. by a re-qualification of dividends
to a repayment of equity.48
47Markle (2012) finds that multinationals with residence in worldwide systems do not differ
from those in territorial systems if they have no pressure to repatriate foreign earnings. Tax
deferral is well documented by e.g. Desai et al. (2001) and Egger et al. (2012).
48For a discussion of different strategies concerning the US law, please see Desai et al. (2003)
and Altshuler and Grubert (2003).
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A second reverse effect could originate from a cfc rule in the acquirer's country
of residence. As in a worldwide tax system, cfc rules result in a home country
taxation while crediting foreign taxes. Thus, the home country determines the
final tax burden. The difference is that specifically defined cfc income is only
affected. Home country taxation accrues independently of income repatriation.
For this reason, cfc rules can be found in territorial systems as well as in worldwide
systems.
This latter fact suggests that cfc rules are tighter than worldwide taxation
and not avoidable. There are additional requirements that have to be met in
order to qualify income as cfc income. Cfc rules have in common, that only
low-taxed foreign income is determined to be cfc income. This is either defined
by a threshold for the foreign tax burden, or by a list of tax-haven countries.
Originating from one of these countries, income is supposed to be low-taxed.
Applied to tax avoidance, this requirement at least raises the bottom line for
low statutory tax rates in the decision, where to allocate profits.
A further constraint can be that income from passive sources is only qualified as
cfc income. Dividends, interest, royalties or leases are typically subsumed under
passive income. In this paper, the incentive to shift real activity is analyzed. The
difference to shifting pure profits is that labor and real capital are shifted to a
low-tax country. The resulting income cannot be regarded as passive income.
For this reason, cfc rules restrict only the shifting of real activity if income from
active sources is included in cfc income. In the empirical analysis, a restrictive
cfc rule is only assumed if active income is considered by the cfc rule49.
49Income from active sources is included in cfc income in: Estonia, Finland, France, the United
Kingdom, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Sweden.
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5.2.2. Incentives to shift Functions. Overall, it can be stated that after joining
an international group, there is an incentive to shift a target firm's profits. If
pure profits cannot be shifted, the firm will shift real activity.
Following the OECD transfer pricing guidelines50, the shifting of functions has
to comply with the arm's length principle. If there are any valuable assets trans-
ferred between two firms, this transfer can be taxed if two unrelated parties would
arrange a compensation. When the transfer of an ongoing concern is evaluated,
one must not simply sum up the separate values of assets. Instead, the value of
the whole concern has to be considered. The guidelines demand for such a val-
uation, but the assessment remains difficult51. If the transaction is taxed based
on market values by the target country, shifting of existing real activity will be
prevented. If values remain sufficiently manipulable, shifting will continue.
Regarding future investments, however, the incentive to shift is unaffected and
the target country will suffer a lower volume of real activity. Due to identical
economic consequences, the shifting of existing real activity or future investments
are not differentiated.
The volume of real activity is measured by the number of employees in a specific
country and the value of total assets in the balance sheet. That way, the input
factors labor and capital are covered. Nevertheless, shifting is only perceived
in the data if one of the two variables is affected. If other factors, e.g. risk,
are shifted, the arm's length price can be manipulated for transactions without
affecting one of the two variables52. Thus, shifting effects tend to be understated
in this analysis.
This analysis aims to measure two tax driven effects:
First, the positive investment effect is measured if profit shifting becomes possible
50OECD (2010).
51Schreiber (2009).
52E.g. an autonomous manufacturing unit could convert into a contract manufacturer with a
low cost-plus remuneration, without affecting the number of employees or total assets.
85
and cost of capital decrease due to an acquisition. Second, the countervailing
negative effect is measured for anti-profit shifting rules. Both effects increase
with the difference between the statutory tax rates in the target country and the
tax rate of the acquiring group53. Both effects occur only if the tax rate in the
target country is above the tax rate of the acquiring group. For this reason, the
sample is reduced to those targets that are taxed with a higher tax rate than the
acquiring group.
5.3. Empirical Analysis.
5.3.1. Data. From the Zephyr (Bureau van Dijk) database all acquisitions are
extracted for the period 1997-2009. The following information is identified: The
target firm, the acquirer and the seller as well as the year of acquisition. Financial
data is merged from the Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk) database. The targets
are only kept in the analysis if they are tagged as active for the whole period.
This guarantees the reliability of financial data. Only share-deals are kept to
exclude a direct influence of the acquisition on the balance sheet. Furthermore,
the transaction has to be completed and the entire capital has to be acquired.
Minority shareholders would negatively affect the incentive for tax avoidance. In
addition, the sample is reduced to targets that do not operate in the financial
services industry. The balance sheet items are not necessarily comparable for this
industry. Moreover, the motivation for acquisitions can be different54.
The analysis tracks purely national targets that become part of a multinational
group. To ensure that targets were not part of a multinational group before,
ownership data is exploited from the Amadeus database. In a first step, all deals
are marked as international deals if the target and the acquirer are not resident in
the same country. In a second step, each national deal is re-sorted to international
53For the acquiring group the lowest available statutory tax rate among all subsidiaries is taken.
54Focarelli et al. (2002).
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if any member-firm within the acquiring group is located in a foreign country.
Using ownership data for the seller firms, the resulting international deals are
taken out of the sample if the target was already part of an international group
before the acquisition.55 The remaining deals are kept if the target country's
statutory tax rate is above the minimum tax rate in the acquiring group. This
condition must be fulfilled in at least one year after the acquisition. Only those
deals are exposed to tax incentives as described above.
For the remaining 1.185 target firms, accounting data is required at least in the
year before the acquisition as well as the year after. The year of acquisition
remains disregarded, as the timing of acquisitions is highly varying within this
year. A comparison is difficult for the effects in this specific year. The final
sample consists of 209 target firms with 1.615 observations, offering data for all
necessary variables.
To conduct this analysis, detailed tax data is necessary: Corporate tax-rates, in-
formation on anti-avoidance regulations, the system to avoid double taxation and
cfc-rules are taken from the IBFD country analyses and the Worldwide Corporate
Tax Guides provided by Ernst and Young. Further information on cfc-rules are
derived from the Guide to Controlled Foreign Company Regimes, provided by
Deloitte.
The following macro controls are included for the target country: GDP, the
growth rate of GDP, the total labor-force and the rate of inflation, measured by
changes in the consumer price index. These are taken from the Worldbank data-
base. Additionally, the corruption perceptions index, provided by Transparency
International, is included.
5.3.2. Econometric Approach. The econometric setting exploits the ability to
track targets over time. Using a panel estimation approach allows to include
55Amadeus ownership data is not provided for past periods. Thus, it is assumed that the
current ownership structure did not change with respect to multinationality of the group.
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target fixed effects to control for any unobserved, time-consistent, target-specific
characteristics influencing the outcome variable. In addition, time-fixed effects
are included to control for unexpected variation over time. The following model
is chosen:
Yj,t = β0+β1∗Aftermergerj,t+β2∗Taxdifj,t+β3∗Strictj,t+β4∗Aftermergerj,t∗
Strictj,t + β5 ∗ Interactionj,t + β6 ∗Xj,t + αi + uj,t.
Yj,t is the dependent variable for firm j in period t. The extent of real activity
in the target country is measured by the logarithm of the number of employees
(Ln(Empl)) and the logarithm of total assets (Ln(Toas)).
Aftermerger is a dummy variable equal to 0 in all periods before the acquisition
and 1 afterwards. Taxdif is the difference between the statutory corporate tax
rate in the target country and the lowest available rate in the acquiring group.
At the moment of acquisition, this variable receives explanatory power. For this
reason, the value is set to 0 for all periods before the acquisition. Strict defines the
strictness of an anti-profit shifting rule. Concerning transfer pricing regulations,
the variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a rule is strict (equal to 1)
or not strict (equal to 0). Concerning interest deduction restrictions, the variable
takes the values of the measure of strictness as defined above. Aftermerger ∗
Strict has to be included as a control term. Interaction is the interaction term
between Taxdif and Strict56. X is a vector of time-varying control variables. α
stands for time-consistent and target-specific characteristics. u is the error term.
β1 captures the change in the dependent variable due to synergy gains caused
by the acquisition. β2 measures the investment effect of acquisitions originating
in the tax incentive. As stated above, β2 is expected to show a positive effect.
High taxed targets will benefit from a lower cost of capital after acquisition by
way of profit shifting. If this effect is restricted, firms have an incentive to adjust
56Due to the definition of the variable Taxdif , the interaction between Aftermerger and
Taxdif is perfectly multicollinear and thus not included in the model.
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their investment in the target country, which is captured by β5. The higher the
statutory corporate tax rate in the target country and the stricter the anti-profit
shifting rule, the stronger is the incentive to reduce real investment. Thus, β5 is
expected to be negative.
The logarithm of sales (Ln(Sales)) is included as a control variable. This accounts
for the importance of the market in the target country from the firm's point
of view. A dummy variable (Loss) is added which equals to 1 if the target
firm makes a loss. Loss firms could behave differently. The logarithm of GDP
(Ln(GDP )) and the growth of GDP (GDPgrowth) are included to control for size
and dynamics of the market in the target country. The variable Ln(Laborforce)
controls for the size of the labor market in the target country. Finally, it is
accounted for risks in the target country. Therefore, the inflation rate (Inflation)
and the corruption perceptions index (Tici) are included.
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Table 5.4: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Ln(Empl) Logarithm of the target firm's number of em-
ployees. Source: Amadeus Database (Bu-
reau van Dijk).
Ln(Toas) Logarithm of the target firm's total assets.
Source: Amadeus Database (Bureau van
Dijk).
Taxdif Measure for tax incentives to shift profits to
low-tax subsidiaries. Calculated as the dif-
ference between the statutory tax rate of the
target country and the lowest available statu-
tory tax rate within the same group.
Tp_dum Dummy variable equal to 1 if a strict trans-
fer pricing regulation is in force in the tar-
get country, equal to 0 otherwise. A transfer
pricing regulation is defined as strict if the
rule is classified into categories 3 to 5. Cate-
gorization follows Lohse et al. (2012).
TC_strictness Strictness of the thin cap rule, calculated as
defined in section 5.1.
Aftermerger Dummy variable equal to 1 if the period is
after the acquisition and 0 otherwise.
Interaction Interaction term between the variables
Taxdif, and the variable Tp_dum or
TC_strictness.
STR Statutory tax rate in the target country.
Source: IBFD, Worldwide Corporate Tax
Guides (Ernst and Young).
Ln(Sales) Logarithm of turnover of the target firm.
Source: Amadeus Database (Bureau van
Dijk).
Continued on next page
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Table 5.4: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Loss Dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm
realized a loss in the tax statement for the
respective year.
Ln(GDP) Logarithm of GDP in the target country.
Source: Worldbank.
GDPgrowth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP in
the target country. Source: Worldbank.
Ln(Labor force) Logarithm of total labor force in the target
country. Source: Worldbank.
Inflation Rate of inflation (consumer prices) in the tar-
get country. Source: Worldbank.
Tici Corruption Perception Index. Source:
Transpareny International.
Table 5.5 provides descriptive statistics for all variables entering the multivariate
analysis.
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Table 5.5. Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Ln(Empl) 1615 4.140 1.380 0 9.100
Ln(Toas) 1615 16.16 1.420 11.37 21.48
Taxdif 1615 0.0400 0.0700 -0.210 0.270
Tp_dum 1615 0.350 0.480 0 1
TC_strictness 1562 0.130 0.120 0 0.400
STR 1615 0.320 0.0500 0.160 0.520
Ln(Sales) 1615 16.42 1.430 9.210 20.39
Loss 1615 0.270 0.450 0 1
Ln(GDP) 1615 26.93 0.880 23.86 28.92
GDPgrowth 1615 2.330 2.530 -8.270 10.68
Ln(Labor force) 1615 16.01 0.830 14.48 17.56
Inflation 1615 0.0300 0.0200 0 0.340
Tici 1615 7.240 1.780 2.100 10
Table 5.6 depicts the regional origins of target firms. As shown, the requirement
of financial data for target firms shrinks the sample exclusively to European
countries, according to the regional coverage of the Amadeus database. The
number of target countries is not large enough for clustering standard errors on
the target country level, as argued by Petersen (2009). To overcome this shortage
of clusters, in all regressions, bootstrapped standard errors are presented clustered
on the target country level.57
57Please see Cameron et al. (2008) for further information on improved inference obtained by
bootstrapping methods.
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Table 5.6: Origins of target firms
Country Number
Belgium 34
Croatia 2
Czech Republic 8
Finland 18
Germany 5
Italy 21
Poland 8
Romania 3
Slovakia 1
Spain 56
Sweden 52
Ukraine 1
Countries of residence of target firms.
For acquiring groups, a matching with financial data is not necessary. The Zephyr
database has a worldwide coverage. Non-European countries are also included,
as shown in table 5.7.58
Table 5.7: Origins of acquiring groups
Country Number
Austria 2
Belgium 7
Canada 2
Croatia 1
Curacao 1
Continued on next page
58Additional countries are included in the calculation of the lowest available statutory corporate
tax rate for each group. For brevity, these countries are not reported.
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Table 5.7: Origins of acquiring groups
Country Number
Cyprus 1
Czech Republic 1
Denmark 11
Finland 9
France 18
Germany 17
Iceland 2
Ireland 5
Italy 3
Japan 5
Korea 1
Luxembourg 2
Netherlands 20
Norway 5
Poland 2
Portugal 2
Russia 2
Slovenia 1
Spain 23
Sweden 31
Switzerland 5
United Kingdom 17
United States 13
Acquiring firms' countries of residence. Where
the global ultimate owner is head-quartered in
a different country, that country is reported.
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5.4. Results.
5.4.1. Main Results. Table 5.8 contains results for the basic regressions. The
dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of employees. All specifications
show a positive coefficient for the variable Aftermerger. For this reduced sample
of acquisitions, synergy gains seem to be of minor relevance59.
Evidence is mixed for a positive investment effect of a decrease in cost of capital
compared to the situation before the acquisition. The sign for the Taxdif coef-
ficients switches between specifications. The coefficient is only significant in the
second regression.
After the acquisition, a strict anti-profit shifting rule results in a significant re-
duction in the number of employees if the newly formed group has a tax incentive
to shift profits out of the target country, as shown by regression 1. The coefficient
for the interaction term shows a 0.51 percentage points decrease in the number
of employees per percentage point in the difference of the statutory tax rates. In
regression 2, the first two years after the acquisition are dropped to allow for a
longer period of adjustment. The effect considerably increases, accounting for a
0.8 percentage points decrease in the number of employees per percentage point
tax difference.60
If both effects are compared, the negative effect of an anti-profit shifting regula-
tion dominates. Overall, there is a 0.2 percentage points reduction in the number
of employees.
59The empirical literature contains mixed results. For an overview please see Gugler and Yur-
toglu (2004). Newer articles document the existence of synergy gains depending on different
deal and country characteristics as hostility of the acquisition (Conyon et al. (2002)) or country
specific labor adjustment cost (Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004)).
60Evaluating the interaction term, the overall effect of a strict transfer pricing regulation has
to be calculated as following: δLn(Empl)δStrict = 0.06 − 0.01 − Taxdif ∗ 0.81. In fact, effects of the
variables Tp_dum and After*Tp_dum are economically insignificant, which is why these can
remain disregarded.
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This result cannot be confirmed for interest deduction restrictions, as tested in
regressions 3 and 4. In the context of an acquisition, profit shifting via debt
shifting seems to be of minor importance61.
Apart from tax effects, the volume of sales has a strictly positive effect on the
number of employees, as equally found in the organizational literature62. The
effect of the absolute market size, measured as size of GDP, seems to have a
negative effect. A positive effect is shown for the size of the labor market. This
finding indicates that highly developed labor markets result in a competitive
advantage. Firms with a tax loss tend to experience an increase in the number
of employees, which shows that loss firms are acquired with particular interests.
Furthermore, there is an incentive to set off former losses against future profits
for tax reasons. The coefficients for the inflation rate indicate a negative effect
of the associated risk on real investment.
Regarding total assets, coefficients for the variable Taxdif indicate a positive
investment effect. This effect is significantly more distinct when allowing for a
longer adjustment period, as done in regressions 2 and 4 (table 5.9). In the long
run, a 1 percentage point tax difference results in an increase in total assets of
about equal size.
This positive effect faces a negative effect if a strict transfer pricing regulation is
in force. The coefficient of the variable Interaction is significantly negative when
controlling for transfer pricing regulations. A 1 percentage point tax difference
comes along with a 0.8 points decrease in total assets. Contrary to the finding
above, here, the positive investment effect dominates.
61This result is supported by the finding of Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) that transfer
pricing is the dominant shifting channel.
62E.g. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004).
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Table 5.8. Number of employees after M&A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aftermerger 0.0640* 0.0544 0.0740 0.0743
(1.65) (0.56) (0.83) (0.36)
Taxdif 0.197 0.616** -0.162 -0.0909
(0.72) (2.00) (-0.22) (-0.06)
Tp_dum 0.0314 0.0629
(0.32) (0.81)
After*Tp_dum 0.00799 -0.0133
(0.09) (-0.13)
TC_strictness -0.565 -0.980*
(-1.42) (-1.93)
After*TC_strictness 0.0545 -0.0254
(0.17) (-0.04)
Interaction -0.510*** -0.809*** 0.497 1.458
(-2.64) (-2.96) (0.19) (0.28)
STR 1.017 0.788 1.231* 0.997
(1.49) (0.78) (1.73) (0.94)
Ln(Sales) 0.436*** 0.458*** 0.432*** 0.454***
(7.48) (6.97) (6.67) (6.51)
Loss 0.0807** 0.0798* 0.0805** 0.0764**
(2.37) (1.89) (2.21) (1.99)
Ln(GDP) -0.511** -0.562** -0.396 -0.399
(-2.16) (-1.97) (-1.27) (-1.01)
GDPgrowth 0.00619 -0.00179 -0.000874 -0.00908
(0.57) (-0.15) (-0.07) (-0.77)
Ln(Labour force) 1.325*** 1.272** 0.915 0.824
(3.13) (2.37) (1.50) (0.89)
Inflation -1.894** -2.185* -1.580 -1.934
(-2.12) (-1.79) (-1.30) (-1.35)
Tici 0.0535 0.0586 0.0313 0.0348
(0.73) (0.66) (0.34) (0.30)
Constant -11.02** -9.163 -7.327 -6.039
(-1.98) (-1.04) (-1.08) (-0.47)
Observations 1615 1204 1562 1158
Number of groups 209 209 208 208
R2 0.421 0.439 0.427 0.449
Dependent variable is Ln(Empl). Regressions 1 and 2 analyze the effect of
transfer pricing regulations after an acquisition. Regressions 3 and 4 analyze
the effect of thin-cap rules. Regressions 2 and 4 allow for a longer period of
adjustment by dropping observations in the first two years after an acquisition.
Transfer pricing regulations are defined as strict if the specific regulation is
sorted into categories 3 to 5. The strictness of thin-cap rules is based on the
maximum debt to equity ratio. Firm specific and year specific fixed effects are
included in all regressions. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered on the
target country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Unlike employees, assets are recorded in the balance sheet. Thus, the shifting of
existing assets results in the taxation of hidden reserves. This could explain, why
total assets react more inelastic than employees. Besides, results indicate that
predominantly labor-intensive functions are shifted.
The importance of a market for a firm (Ln(Sales)) is positively related to the
volume of real investments. Regarding total assets, the same is true for the
absolute size of the market, measured as the size of the GDP. As before, a high
inflation risk is associated with lower investments in the target country.
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Table 5.9. Total assets after M&A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aftermerger 0.0330 -0.172*** 0.0594 -0.106
(0.69) (-2.61) (0.63) (-0.95)
Taxdif 0.377*** 1.041*** 0.152 0.433
(2.75) (3.98) (0.48) (0.91)
Tp_dum 0.00388 -0.00743
(0.05) (-0.09)
After*Tp_dum 0.0789 0.166
(0.84) (1.41)
TC_strictness 0.00948 -0.0179
(0.02) (-0.03)
After*TC_strictness 0.171 0.178
(0.46) (0.43)
Interaction -0.668*** -0.797** -1.088 0.128
(-3.18) (-2.25) (-0.92) (0.07)
STR -0.382 -1.056 0.547 -0.114
(-0.42) (-0.97) (0.71) (-0.12)
Ln(Sales) 0.433*** 0.494*** 0.436*** 0.501***
(15.95) (29.21) (15.69) (29.59)
Loss 0.0325 0.0475 0.0329 0.0495
(0.91) (1.34) (0.88) (1.48)
Ln(GDP) 0.537 0.446 0.832** 0.710*
(1.33) (1.01) (2.36) (1.86)
GDPgrowth -0.00291 -0.00814 -0.0129 -0.0198
(-0.19) (-0.51) (-0.83) (-1.20)
Ln(Labour force) 0.246 0.171 -0.190 -0.353
(0.38) (0.29) (-0.28) (-0.55)
Inflation -3.031** -2.205 -1.933* -1.108
(-2.54) (-1.61) (-1.65) (-0.83)
Tici 0.0207 0.0321 0.00460 -0.00384
(0.28) (0.45) (0.11) (-0.08)
Constant -9.558 -6.745 -10.65 -5.536
(-1.28) (-0.85) (-1.63) (-0.72)
Observations 1615 1204 1562 1158
Number of groups 209 209 208 208
R2 0.703 0.730 0.706 0.732
Dependent variable is Ln(Toas). Regressions 1 and 2 analyze the effect of
transfer pricing regulations after an acquisition. Regressions 3 and 4 analyze
the effect of thin-cap rules. Regressions 2 and 4 allow for a longer period of
adjustment by dropping observations in the first two years after an acquisition.
Transfer pricing regulations are defined as strict if the specific regulation is
sorted into categories 3 to 5. The strictness of thin-cap rules is based on the
maximum debt to equity ratio. Firm specific and year specific fixed effects are
included in all regressions. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered on the
target country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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5.4.2. Inclusion of anti-profit shifting rules in the acquirer country. According to
the results in the preceding section, firms react to transfer pricing restrictions
by adjusting the quantity of employees in the target country, following an acqui-
sition.63 Consequently, the remaining question is whether the acquiring group's
country of residence can influence this reaction. As argued above, worldwide tax
systems could reduce the benefit of international tax rate arbitrage. Affected
firms are supposed to show a lower reaction to anti-profit shifting regulations.
In table 5.10 the sample is divided according to the system used to avoid inter-
national double taxation. The first and the third column include all acquiring
groups underlying a worldwide tax system. The second and the fourth column
include observations, where the exemption method applies. For the number of
employees as dependent variable, the negative effect of anti-transfer pricing regu-
lations can only be proved for groups underlying an exemption system. The effect
is less pronounced for the group of worldwide taxed firms. Moreover, the posi-
tive investment effect is stronger for the tax exempted group. Nevertheless, the
difference between the two groups is not statistically significant for both effects,
at conventional levels.
Regressions 3 and 4 analyze the effects on total assets. The negative effect for
the worldwide taxed group exceeds the effect for the tax exempted group. This
is against the expectations. Again, this difference is not statistically different at
conventional levels.
Overall, the differentiation between worldwide taxed and tax exempted groups
gives no clear picture. The results indicate that firms can partially overcome
the negative incentives of worldwide tax systems. This can be explained by
63As there was no evidence found for an effect of thin-cap rules, further analyses are solely based
on transfer pricing regulations. None of the distinguished groups shows statistically significant
effects of thin-cap rules. Results are available upon request.
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deferral or alternative repatriation strategies64. Possibly, a further differentiation
by the necessity of repatriation would give further insights, analogously to Markle
(2012)65.
Compared to worldwide tax systems, cfc rules are the more specific and stricter
rules to prevent international tax rate arbitrage. The repatriation of foreign
earnings is no necessary precondition to tax foreign income if the limits of the cfc
rule are violated.
In table 5.11 the sample is split into acquisitions, where the acquiring group un-
derlies a cfc rule (regressions 1 and 3) and acquisitions, where such a rule does
not exist (regressions 2 and 4).
The shifting of real activity will not be qualified as passive income. For this rea-
son, cfc rules are only taken into account if active income is particularly covered
by the rule.
Regarding the number of employees, there is a positive but statistically insignif-
icant investment effect for the group, which is not covered by a cfc rule. This
is shown by the variable Taxdif in regression 2. The coefficient indicates a 0.86
percentage points increase per percentage point tax difference. The estimated
coefficient for the interaction term is significantly negative for acquisitions in this
group. A 1.0 percentage point higher tax difference results in a 1.07 percentage
points reduction of the number of employees in the target country if a strict trans-
fer pricing regulation is enacted. This group exhibits the highest coefficient in
this study. This effect is dominating compared to the positive, but insignificant
investment effect. Overall, with a 1.0 percentage point higher tax difference, the
64Both strategies are well documented by empirical literature. Desai et al. (2001) and Egger et
al. (2012) document tax deferral. Alternative repatriation strategies are analyzed by Desai et
al. (2003) and Altshuler and Grubert (2003) concerning US law.
65This would result in a further reduction of the sample size, which is why such an analysis is
left out.
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Table 5.10. Differentiation between worldwide tax systems and
exemption systems
Dependent Variable Ln(Empl) Ln(Toas)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aftermerger 0.351*** -0.205* -0.222 -0.319***
(2.85) (-1.67) (-1.51) (-4.82)
Taxdif 0.108 1.018 1.829*** 1.385***
(0.17) (1.56) (2.98) (5.63)
Tp_dum 0.0965 -0.0449 0.0546 0.0946
(0.75) (-0.43) (0.43) (0.69)
After*Tp_dum -0.231 0.271* 0.190 0.178
(-1.17) (1.78) (1.38) (0.48)
Interaction -0.259 -1.001** -1.968*** -0.734*
(-0.33) (-2.33) (-2.71) (-1.88)
STR -0.475 2.787 -1.952 0.963
(-0.62) (1.62) (-1.28) (0.71)
Ln(Sales) 0.587*** 0.375*** 0.489*** 0.472***
(4.27) (9.32) (4.33) (10.27)
Loss 0.0514 0.101 -0.0917** 0.126***
(1.51) (1.61) (-2.09) (3.84)
Ln(GDP) -0.615 -0.725** 0.686* 0.554
(-1.44) (-2.11) (1.80) (0.59)
GDPgrowth -0.0147 0.0110 -0.0101 -0.0340*
(-1.04) (0.66) (-0.55) (-1.82)
Ln(Labour force) 1.013 1.874** 0.841 -2.179
(0.76) (2.29) (0.78) (-1.54)
Inflation -1.132 -0.0202 -0.225 -5.850**
(-0.46) (-0.02) (-0.18) (-2.39)
Tici 0.0393 0.0599 0.0146 -0.00530
(0.35) (0.63) (0.21) (-0.05)
Constant -4.849 -14.23 -22.90 28.08
(-0.19) (-0.97) (-1.14) (1.57)
Observations 614 576 614 576
Number of groups 126 129 126 129
R2 0.449 0.457 0.728 0.735
In regressions 1 and 3 observations are only included if the acquiring group
is located in a country with a worldwide tax system. Regressions 2 and 4
include the remaining observations. In all regressions the variable Strict refers
to transfer pricing regulations. Transfer pricing regulations are defined as strict
if the specific regulation is sorted into categories 3 to 5. Firm specific and year
specific fixed effects are included in all regressions. Bootstrapped standard
errors are clustered on the target country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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number of employees in the target country is reduced by about 0.21 percentage
points. If there is a restriction by a cfc rule the effect of a transfer pricing reg-
ulation turns positive and the investment effect is diminished. Thus, if cfc rules
are designed to cover active income tax incentives to shift real activity to low-tax
subsidiaries are eliminated.
With respect to the volume of total assets, the investment effect is only signifi-
cantly different from 0 for the group without a cfc rule. The same applies to the
negative effect of a transfer pricing regulation.
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Table 5.11. Differentiation by cfc rule
Dependent Variable Ln(Empl) Ln(Toas)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aftermerger 0.246** -0.0829 -0.0627 -0.251***
(2.11) (-0.67) (-0.26) (-3.00)
Taxdif 0.294 0.861 0.423 1.266***
(0.55) (1.57) (0.64) (4.09)
Tp_dum 0.222 -0.0203 -0.222 0.0845
(1.38) (-0.25) (-1.03) (0.91)
After*Tp_dum -0.583*** 0.223* 0.240 0.170
(-3.30) (1.71) (1.26) (0.92)
Interaction 0.846** -1.073*** -0.461 -0.776*
(2.43) (-3.48) (-0.46) (-1.87)
STR -0.910 1.988* -2.214 0.0567
(-0.78) (1.70) (-0.98) (0.04)
Ln(Sales) 0.621*** 0.366*** 0.497*** 0.488***
(5.40) (9.83) (4.27) (10.09)
Loss 0.146** 0.0684 0.0259 0.0679*
(2.43) (1.44) (0.44) (1.72)
Ln(GDP) -0.311 -0.681*** 0.867 0.231
(-0.57) (-2.76) (1.54) (0.43)
GDPgrowth -0.0196 -0.00660 -0.00799 -0.00740
(-0.95) (-0.36) (-0.27) (-0.48)
Ln(Labour force) 1.067 1.170** 0.290 -0.363
(0.46) (2.51) (0.17) (-0.42)
Inflation -1.699 -1.158 -1.690 -1.600
(-0.44) (-0.96) (-0.71) (-0.78)
Tici 0.0488 0.0524 -0.0223 0.0582
(0.28) (0.90) (-0.24) (0.62)
Constant -14.90 -3.399 -19.29 7.109
(-0.33) (-0.32) (-0.59) (0.53)
Observations 492 712 492 712
Number of groups 87 122 87 122
R2 0.512 0.453 0.735 0.737
In regressions 1 and 3 observations are only included if the acquiring group is
located in a country where a cfc rule is in force. Thereby, cfc rules are only
considered if active income is covered by the rule. Regressions 2 and 4 include
the remaining observations. Transfer pricing regulations are defined as strict if
the specific regulation is sorted into categories 3 to 5. Firm specific and year
specific fixed effects are included in all regressions. Bootstrapped standard
errors are clustered on the target country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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5.5. Conclusions. This paper addresses the effect of mergers and acquisitions
on the volume of real activity in the target country. Therefore, originally purely
domestic target firms are tracked after their acquisition by a multinational group.
Evidence is given for a positive investment effect. This effect occurs if the tar-
get firm is high taxed and cost of capital decrease after the acquisition, due to
intra-group profit shifting. In the long run, the number of employees increases
by 0.6, total assets by 1.0 percentage points with a 1 percentage point higher tax
incentive to shift profits out of the target country.
In addition, clear evidence is given for a heavily negative shifting effect of anti-
transfer pricing regulations on the volume of real activity in the target country.
If profit shifting via the manipulation of transfer prices is restricted a 1 percent-
age point higher tax incentive results in a 0.5 percentage points decrease in the
number of employees. This decrease is even stronger, amounting to 0.8 percent-
age points, when allowing for a three years adjustment period. Regarding total
assets, this effect amounts to 0.8 percentage points in the long run.
Comparing both effects, the negative shifting effect exceeds the positive invest-
ment effect with respect to employees in the target country. In particular, labor-
intensive functions are negatively affected. A negative effect concerning the re-
striction of debt shifting cannot be proved.
If an acquirer is able to shift profitable functions to low-tax countries, anti-profit
shifting regulations do not prevent an ownership advantage for multinational
groups. Instead of pure profits, real activity will be shifted between subsidiaries.
The country of residence of the group's head-quarter is able to eliminate this tax
incentive. Therefore, cfc rules are an appropriate instrument.
After all, it is in the hands of the country of residence of the acquiring firm to cut
an ownership advantage of multinational groups, with respect to tax avoidance.
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6. Corporate Group Complexity in Territorial and Worldwide
Countries.
Corporate Group Complexity in
Territorial and Worldwide
Countries.66
66This project bases on a common research idea with Christian Steffens (University of
Mannheim) and Johannes Voget (University of Mannheim).
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6.1. Introduction. The literature offers deep insights into potential conflicts
between shareholders of a firm and managers, going back to Jensen and Meckling
(1976). It is well known that managerial behaviour must not necessarily be in
line with shareholders' aims. Instead, there is some managerial discretion where
to allocate funds of the firm, constituting an expropriation risk for shareholders.67
Governance systems as well as compensation schemes are intended to assure the
fair share of income for shareholders. Furthermore, Desai et al. (2007) find that
a better tax enforcement is able to reduce managerial diversion.
There are specific firm characteristics leading to an increased expropriation risk.
Bodnar et al. (1999) hypothesize that within multinational corporations moni-
toring of management decisions will be more difficult as these are more complex.
Denis et al. (2002) confirm that high geographic diversification of a firm is priced
with a value discount. Regarding management compensation, Black et al. (2014)
show that compensation increases with the complexity of firms. However, this
relation does not hold if complexity is equivalent to managerial discretion with
a high risk of resources' diversion. While complexity can be disadvantageous for
shareholders, tax rules induce often more complex group structures.68 This study
picks up tax rules regarding profit repatriation. We test if higher repatriation tax
cost lead to more complex group structures.
Group structures of corporations are driven by various factors. Besides organiza-
tional needs and control reasons, taxes can be one driver affecting the decision,
how to integrate operational subsidiaries into the specific group. Besides repa-
triation taxes69, taxation at the source (withholding taxes) and the taxation of
capital gains have to be considered. Evidence for the importance of withholding
67e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
68Desai et al. (2007).
69While this term includes taxes imposed by the source state, here only taxation by the head-
quarters' state of residence is referred to.
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taxes is given by Dreßler (2012), Lewellen and Robinson (2013) and Mintz and
Weichenrieder (2010). The influence of repatriation taxes is not yet fully analysed.
Lewellen and Robinson (2013) find for a set of U.S. multinationals that owner-
ship links within a group occur more frequently if a specific tax deferral strategy
is enabled. Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010) analyze inbound investments into
Germany. Inconsistent with theory, they find a lower probability for the use of
holding companies if the headquarter is taxed worldwide and repatriation taxes
are high.
With respect to international tax planning strategies, the benefit is constituted
by the reduction of the final tax burden on foreign earnings. There exists a vast
empirical literature examining tax-induced profit shifting behaviour of multina-
tional corporations.70 Thereby, the two most prominent shifting-channels are
transfer-pricing and the allocation of debt. Both result in high taxable income
in low-tax countries. Even if income taxes paid by the subsidiary can be reduced
significantly, the calculation of the overall benefit has to consider total taxes in
case of repatriation. Worldwide tax systems (also called credit systems) and terri-
torial tax systems (also called exemption systems) have to be differentiated. In a
worldwide system, in general, the worldwide income is taxed in the home country.
In a territorial system, income is only taxed from sources within the territory of
the home country. As the total tax burden can be different in both systems, the
incentives for international profit shifting will be different, too. Markle (2012)
finds that whether a multinational is located in a territorial country or in a world-
wide country, this can affect the extent of its' profit shifting. This is not true for
multinationals that are taxed worldwide and not exposed to any pressure to repa-
triate foreign earnings. Those are comparable in their volume of profit shifting to
companies located in a territorial system. Likewise Maffini (2012) does not find
a statistically significant difference between multinationals located in worldwide
70For an overview, see Feld et al. (2013).
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or territorial jurisdictions, regarding their marginal effective tax bases. These
results are a contradiction to theory. Markle (2012) explains his results with the
strategy of tax deferral. The existence of deferral strategies is documented by a
wide literature.71 Consequently, Barrios et al. (2012) show that the elasticity of
location decisions to repatriation cost is reduced significantly if the possibility of
deferral is given. Additionally, there could be ways to repatriate earnings without
repatriation taxes.72 Both tax planning strategies necessarily come along with a
reaction of the ownership structure within the corporate group (group structure).
Our study is related to three strands of literature: (1) Our contribution is twofold
to the growing literature concerning tax influences on group structures. First, we
use a setting that allows to analyze the specific influence of repatriation cost.
Using ownership data for the years 2005 and 2012 allows to track groups over
time that experience a change in tax regimes. Thereby, tax regimes are sub-
divided into worldwide and territorial on a countrypair-level. We control for
other possibly relevant tax-factors as well as for unobservable effects at the level
of the group by integrating group-fixed effects.
Second, we relate tax drivers to a complexity measure, which is not yet used in this
context. Complexity is defined as the number of holding companies interposed
between the parent company and the operational subsidiary. By looking at the
length of the ownership chain, we are able to test if tax factors yield additional
legal entities and thus increase the complexity of the group.
(2) There is a large literature on firm organization from a management perspec-
tive. Mainly, this literature has in common that arguments are based on the
objective to minimize transaction cost as an explanation for the origin of firms,
going back to Coase (1937). As determinants of organizational structures pro-
cesses of decision-making and knowledge-accumulation as well as the decision to
71See e.g. Desai et al. (2001) and Egger et al. (2012).
72Altshuler and Grubert (2003) examine those strategies analytically and empirically for a
sample of US multinationals.
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diversify firms are identified.73 Additional levels in the ownership chain also mean
an additional level for decision-making and financial reporting.74
In the corporate finance literature, outside ownership of minority shareholders is
identified as a possible explanation for pyramid structures (e.g. La Porta et al.
(1999), Dharwadkar et al. (2000)). Thereby, these structures bear the incentive to
expropriate minority shareholders by transferring profits to the majority owner.75
While in our dataset the majority of firms is wholly owned by its ultimate owner,
the expropriation of minority shareholders has minor influence in the sence of La
Porta et al. (1999). Our study highlights the impact of taxes on the construction
of ownership chains as well as the profitability of the single entity.
(3) An extended literature analyses other distortions in firms' behaviour caused
by worldwide tax regimes. Edwards et al. (2012) find that firms with a large
amount of cash, trapped in foreign subsidiaries, are more likely to make value-
destroying acquisitions. Feld et al. (2013) show that repatriation taxes reduce
the competitiveness of domestic investors on the international M&A market. The
effect of the tax system on location decisions is tested by: Barrios et al. (2012)
and Dyreng et al. (2011) (with respect to the location of foreign subsidiaries);
e.g. Smart (2011) (with respect to FDI); Huizinga and Voget (2009) analysing
the location choice of headquarters in multinational mergers and Voget (2011)
analysing headquarter relocations.
73e.g. Garicano (2000), Aghion et al. (2013), Bloom et al. (2012).
74Most countries split up the right of taxation between different jurisdictions by referring to the
place of management. E.g. Germany would only forgo taxing the income of a foreign subsidiary
if there are to a certain extent business operations in its country of residence, being responsible
for daily business decisions. In our dataset only Bulgaria, Estonia, Ireland, Lithunia, Latvia,
Sweden and the United States do exclusively refer to the legal origin of an entity.
75Masulis et al. (2009) find that these incentives are diversely pronounced between different
layers of an ownership chain. Their analysis indicates that the lowest entity in a chain actually
exhibits the best performance. Thereby, performance is measured alternatively as Tobin's Q or
return on assets.
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Following this introduction, section 2 of the paper develops the testable hypoth-
esis. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and the data. Section 4
presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
6.2. Corporate Group Complexity in Territorial and Worldwide Coun-
tries. Within the framework of Devereux and Maffini (2007) firms decide on the
allocation of profits in a final step.76 Thereby, the minimization of the tax burden
on repatriated earnings is necessary to evaluate entities, where profits could be
allocated. In a worldwide system, foreign earnings are, at least, taxed with the
home country corporate tax rate in case of repatriation. Thus, firms having their
headquarter in countries with a worldwide tax system, basically, do not have an
incentive to shift profits into low-tax countries.77
6.2.1. Tax planning incentives in different systems to avoid international double
taxation. The total tax burden on foreign earnings is composed of taxation at
the level of the subsidiary as well as at the level of the parent. Corporate taxes
are raised in source country s, amounting to the statutory tax rate cit multiplied
with the pre-tax income of the entity. In addition, there can be a withholding tax
in country s, calculated as the tax rate whts multiplied with the pre-tax income
diminished by the corporate income tax burden. Differences between systems
result from the taxation in the home country h.
In general, in exemption systems, taxes on the income of foreign subsidiaries are
exclusively raised by the source country.78 In some cases, home countries add a
flat, non-deductible expense, calculated as a share of the received dividends (1−
76Devereux and Maffini (2007) classify the decisions of firms concerning foreign investments in
four steps. First, the decision on the allocation of production at home and the export of goods,
or producing abroad. Second, the selection of a specific foreign country for the production
location. Third, the firm has to choose the scale of investment. Fourth, the profits are allocated
within the group.
77This does not hold in case of an excess credit.
78Commonly, the terms territorial and worldwide taxation refer to the taxation of foreign
dividends. Therefore, here subsidiaries are only considered.
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exemptedh) to the parents' tax base. At most, in this dataset, the percentage to
add is 5 percent of received dividends.79 Taxes paid at source cannot be credited.
In exemption systems, source taxes represent a final tax burden. The total tax
burden of repatriated profits, assuming one unit earnings before tax, is calculated
as cits +whts ∗ (1− cits) + (1− exemptedh) ∗ cith ∗ (1− cits− (whts ∗ (1− cits)).80
Thereby, cits stands for the corporate income tax burden in the source country,
whts ∗ (1 − cits) for the withholding tax due to the repatriated dividend and
(1− exemptedh) ∗ cith ∗ (1− cits − (whts ∗ (1− cits)) represents the tax burden
imposed by the parent country.
Credit systems are distinguished between limited and unlimited, and indirect
and direct credit systems.81 In limited credit systems, the home country caps the
creditable amount at the level of the statutory tax rate applied to foreign income.
In unlimited credit systems, foreign taxes can be credited without a limitation
in the total amount. As unlimited credit systems cannot be found in reality, a
limited credit system is assumed. In direct as well as indirect credit systems the
relation between source and home country taxation is crucial. If creditable source
taxes are lower than taxes in the home country, the difference corresponds to the
tax due in the home country. Otherwise, there is no additional tax liability in the
home country. Indirect and direct credit systems differ in the kind of tax that can
be credited. In an indirect credit system, corporate taxes and withholding taxes
can both be credited. The total tax burden is calculated as cits+whts ∗ (1− cits)
in case of an excess credit. Otherwise it corresponds to the corporate income
tax of the home country.82 In a direct credit system, only withholding taxes
795 percent have to be added in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and Japan (Japan introduced
its' 95%-exemption in 2009), 3 % in Norway. Differences exist in the definition of the tax base.
Most countries take dividends net of withholding taxes as a basis. Germany and Japan do not
allow for deduction of withholding taxes.
80In case of Germany and Japan, the home country taxation has to be adjusted for the non-
deductible withholding tax to (1− exemptedh) ∗ cith ∗ (1− cits).
81Actually in our final dataset only indirect credit systems are available. As results can be
transferred to direct credit systems, both are considered here.
82The necessary condition for an excess credit is cith <= cits + whts ∗ (1− cits).
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can be credited. Hence, the total tax burden in case of an excess credit is still
cits + whts ∗ (1 − cits) and cits + cith ∗ (1 − cits) otherwise.83 In each case, the
final tax burden equals at least the home country corporate income tax rate. Tax
burdens vary depending on characteristics of source and home country taxation.
For this reason, our analysis has to be conducted on a country-pair level.
A comparison of both systems allows the conclusion that in exemption systems
source taxes are always final taxes. Thus, any reduction in source taxes yields a
benefit for the parent company. In a credit system, however, it depends on the
relation between source and home country tax burdens. The reduction of home
country taxation is beneficial as long as it does not result in an excess credit
situation. In an excess credit situation, a reduction of source taxes down to the
level of the home country tax can be beneficial. This is the case if cross-crediting
between relatively high and relatively low taxed subsidiaries is not possible. A
further reduction has only a temporary effect, ending with repatriation.84 As
illustrated in table 6.1, the mean statutory corporate tax rate for credit coun-
tries is about seven percentage points above the mean for exemption countries in
both years. Table 6.2 reports mean repatriation cost, imposed by the home coun-
try. A direct ownership link is assumed. In 2005 and 2012 taxes on repatriated
earnings, on average, are considerably higher for credit countries. Consequently,
repatriation cost can be quite substantial. For this reason, the reduction or com-
plete avoidance of repatriation cost is expected to be taken into consideration
by multinationals. The high repatriation cost in direct credit systems reflect
the interdiction to credit the source country's corporate income tax. An unre-
strained incentive for international tax planning is only given if repatriation cost
are (calculatoryly) vanished.
83Accordingly the condition for an excess credit is cith <= whts.
84The distribution effect between tax authorities remains disregarded.
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Table 6.1. Mean Statutory Tax Rates
System 2005 2012
Exemption System 0.3084 0.2874
Credit System 0.3786 0.3672
For the composition of countries see tables 6.3 and 6.4.
Table 6.2. Mean Repatriation Cost
System 2005 2012
Exemption System 0.007 0.006
Indirect Credit System 0.075 0.101
Direct Credit System 0.198 0.204
The table contains mean home country tax burdens on repatriated
foreign earnings. It is differentiated into exemption and credit sys-
tems. A (hypothetical) direct ownership structure is assumed. For
the composition of countries see tables 6.3 and 6.4.
6.2.2. Strategies to adapt the tax planning environment. In worldwide systems
an additional tax planning step is necessary to adapt the same conditions as in
an exemption system. Basically, there are two strategies to avoid repatriation
taxes: Deferral and the switchover to the exemption system. Both result in a
more complicated group structure.
Tax deferral
If repatriation taxes can be deferred by the taxpayer a valuable time advantage
arises. With an increasing time period of deferral, the incentives of the taxpayer
converge to those in an exemption system. In case of an infinite deferral, congru-
ence is given. Desai et al. (2003) conclude that ownership chains enable specific
deferral strategies. Notably, these are the 'triangular strategy' and the 'multiple
tier strategy', which are identified by Altshuler and Grubert (2003). The tri-
angular strategy aims to achieve a payout to the headquarter without causing
repatriation taxes. Therefore, certain rules of the US tax law are exploited. In
the multiple tier strategy, retained earnings of foreign subsidiaries are invested
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into lower-tier subsidiaries. A repatriation is not necessary to the headquarter.
This strategy is based on the fact that in a credit system foreign earnings are
first taxable when being repatriated. Therefore, the multiple tier strategy ap-
plies to every credit system. While this strategy implicates further investments
into subsidiaries, it is observable that US groups accumulate high amounts of
cash abroad.85 Even if foreign earnings are not reinvested, we expect that high
cash reserves abroad come along with an additional layer within the ownership
chain. The following quotation stems from the testimony of Apple Inc. before
the permanent subcommittee on investigations of the US senate from May 21,
2013:
'AOI ('Apple Operations International') consolidates and manages
a substantial portion of Apple's foreign, post-tax income through
intercompany dividends. This consolidation creates economies of
scale that allow AOI to obtain better rates of return with money
management firms. The consolidation of funds into as few bank
accounts as possible improves operational controls over cash held
within and among other foreign subsidiaries. AOI allows Apple to
efficiently redeploy funds to meet the needs of Apple's international
operations.'
Instead of local cash reserves within single entities, the group will accumulate
reserves in a holding company, located abroad. This holding company will usually
be located on top of the foreign corporate structure, to allow for intercompany
dividends as a cheap and flexible way of transfer. As stated in the testimony,
this holding company operates as a cash-pool and therefore allows to exploit
economies of scale. A high position in the ownership chain will also guarantee
85According to Bloomberg (Article from Mar 12, 2014, Cash Abroad Rises $206 Billion as Apple
to IBM Avoid Tax) total cash trapped abroad by US companies amounts to $1.95 trillion at
the end of 2013. This article can be found at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-
03-12/cash-abroad-rises-206-billion-as-apple-to-ibm-avoid-tax.html [last downloaded 15-03-12].
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a high visibility of foreign cash for shareholders and the best suitability to be
pledged.86
Switchover to exemption
As illustrated in Figure 6.1, in some countries the method to avoid interna-
tional double taxation varies on a country-pair level. Among the countries in
our dataset, Norway uses unilaterally the indirect credit method. On a bilateral
level, the majority of double tax treatments, signed by Norway, allows for the
exemption method. Therefore, the taxpayer has the option to insert a holding
company, located in an exemption country (here Sweden) to avoid repatriation
taxes. In doing so, the holding country itself has to exempt foreign dividends.
Figure 6.1. Switchover from credit to exemption
Another strategy to avoid repatriation taxes bases on the use of excess credits.
Taxpayers are willing to offset excess credits against deficit credits under the
following conditions: There have to be foreign subsidiaries in at least two different
countries. One country has a tax rate higher than the home country. The other
86In fact it can be observed that US corporations issue debt in the US to avoid repa-
triation taxes while foreign cash serves as collateral. For example see Apple, Bloomberg
article: Apple Sells $12 Billion of Bonds to Keep Cash Overseas, April 29, 2014, avail-
able at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-29/apple-returns-to-bond-market-
to-scale-biggest-borrowers-ranks.html [last downloaded 2015-03-12].
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country has a lower tax rate.87 While this strategy is appropriate to reduce
repatriation taxes to a certain level, it is not suitable in an aggressive international
tax planning setting. Excess credits are essential for cross-crediting but not in
line with a reduction of foreign source taxes.88
Tax deferral as well as the switchover to the exemption method enable tax payers
to adapt the same tax planning calculus as in the case of an exemption system.
Companies have a strong incentive to implement the strategies, as characterized
above. If implemented an additional layer is necessary in the ownership chain.
For this reason, we expect groups, located in worldwide tax systems, to have
longer ownership chains.
6.3. Empirical Analysis.
6.3.1. Data. We use ownership structures for a worldwide dataset of corpora-
tions, provided by the ORBIS database from Bureau van Dijk. Although this
database is only available for the current year, we have access to data for the
years 2005 and 2012. This data allows for the reconstruction of ownership links
within corporate groups. Beginning with a full download, containing 5,763,675
observations for 2012, we keep only those 916,322, where the immediate share-
holder is known.
We survey the whole ownership chain to separate entities fulfilling holding func-
tions from those being purely operational. For this reason, we drop holding
companies as redundant observations. We keep only those chains, where the
global ultimate owner is reached.
87As mentioned above, an immediate offsetting of excess foreign tax credits against taxes, due
on income from domestic sources, is generally not allowed.
88Contrary to the US, where cross-crediting is limited within several baskets of foreign in-
come, UK and Japan allow an overall limitation. Thus, cross-crediting does not afford holding
structures in these countries.
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In this study, we focus exclusively on corporations because these are taxed fol-
lowing the separation principle, which is indispensable for the planning strategies
in mind. The deferral strategy bases on the fact that foreign income, taxed under
the separation principle, can only be taxed in case of dividend repatriation by the
home country. On the contrary, partnerships' income is taxed by the home coun-
try at the moment of realisation, independent of repatriation. The switchover
strategy exploits favourable bilateral tax treaties linked one to another by inte-
grating holding-companies into the ownership chain. Contrary to corporations,
partnerships are not eligible for tax treaties. These are transparent for tax pur-
poses. Thus, the shareholders residence determines, which tax treaty is relevant,
not the residence of the partnership.
We measure variation on a country-pair level. For this reason, we match the
remaining 538,382 observations for the year 2012 to the 2005 dataset. We keep
those 138,498 observations, where the same global ultimate owner89 has at least
one subsidiary within the same country in both years.
Observations are aggregated on the group/subsidiary country level, resulting in
35,592 observations.
Our final sample consists of 25,114 observations for which financial and macro
data is available. Out of these, 14,620 observations are combinations of head-
quarters and subsidiaries within the same country. 10,494 observations are cross-
border, which are relevant for our main tests. Ownership chains within the same
country are excluded as for those repatriation taxes do not exist.
Table 6.3 contains the list of countries, where the operative subsidiaries are lo-
cated.
89Corporate groups are identified by the global ultimate owners, which are the highest entity
in the chain, consisting of majority controlled ownership links. At best, these are tracked by
Bureau van Dijks' internal ID numbers, which can change over time. We control for that by
tracking ID numbers, using the ID-Changes database from Bureau van Dijk.
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Table 6.3: List of subsidiary countries
Country Number
Austria 142
Australia 174
Belgium 604
Bulgaria 32
Bolivia 2
Brazil 30
Canada 8
China 2
Colombia 2
Czech Republic 266
Germany 604
Denmark 418
Ecuador 4
Estonia 90
Egypt 8
Spain 800
Finland 280
France 1,250
Gabon 2
United Kingdom 2,008
Greece 8
Hong Kong 6
Croatia 44
Hungary 10
Indonesia 12
Ireland 364
Israel 2
India 46
Italy 540
Jamaica 2
Japan 18
South Korea 8
Sri Lanka 2
Lithuania 42
Luxembourg 50
Latvia 44
Morocco 12
Malawi 2
Mexico 20
Continued on next page
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Table 6.3: List of subsidiary countries
Country Number
Netherlands 850
Norway 364
New Zealand 8
Panama 2
Peru 24
Papua New Guinea 2
Pakistan 8
Poland 464
Portugal 152
Russia 42
Sweden 424
Singapore 112
Slovenia 6
Slovakia 64
Ukraine 8
South Africa 4
Zambia 2
The list of countries, where group's headquarters are located, is presented by
table 6.4.
Table 6.4: List of headquarter countries
Country Number
Austria 98
Australia 78
Belgium 510
Canada 16
Switzerland 590
Czech Republic 4
Germany 982
Denmark 306
Estonia 8
Spain 248
Finland 324
France 1,134
United Kingdom 844
Greece 32
Hungary 16
Continued on next page
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Table 6.4: List of headquarter countries
Country Number
Ireland 112
Israel 28
Italy 348
Japan 1,032
Luxembourg 80
Netherlands 448
Norway 142
Poland 2
Portugal 24
Sweden 918
Slovenia 12
Turkey 2
United States 2,156
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Table 6.5: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Sum of holdings Number of holding countries interposed be-
tween the headquarter and purely operative
subsidiaries. Observations are aggregated on
the group/subsidiary country level.
Number
of chains
Number of ownership chains adding to the
variable Sum of Holdings.
Treatment Dummy variable equal to one if the head-
quarter/subsidiary pair is exposed to a policy
change and 0 else.
After Dummy variable equal to 1 for all 2012 obser-
vations (after the policy change) and 0 else.
Aftertreat Interaction term between the variables Treat-
ment and After.
Wht (effective) Effective withholding tax rate in case of
a hypothetical direct repatriation from the
source country to the parent country. Source:
IBFD, Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides
(Ernst and Young).
Wht (statutory) Statutory withholding tax rate in case of
a hypothetical direct repatriation from the
source country to the parent country. Source:
IBFD, Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides
(Ernst and Young).
Cgtax Capital gains tax rate in the parent coun-
try. Source: IBFD, Worldwide Corporate
Tax Guides (Ernst and Young).
Cfcrule Dummy variable indicating if there is a cfc-
rule in force in the parent country. Source:
IBFD, Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides
(Ernst and Young).
Continued on next page
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Table 6.5: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Taxhaven Dummy variable indicating if the subsidiary
country is a taxhaven. Taxhavens are char-
acterised by a corporate tax rate less or equal
to 0.15.
Corporatetaxrate Statutory corporate tax rate of the parent
country. Source: IBFD, Worldwide Corpo-
rate Tax Guides (Ernst and Young).
Ln(toas) Natural logarithm of the variable total assets
of the headquarter. Source: Orbis database,
Bureau van Dijk.
Ln(dist) Natural logarithm of the simple distance be-
tween the most populated cities of the parent
and the subsidiary country.
EU Dummy variable indicating if the headquar-
ter and the subsidiary are located within the
European Union.
Ln(GDP_pc) Natural logarithm of the GDP per capita of
the parent country. Source: Worldbank.
Inflationrate Inflationrate (cpi) of the subsidiary country.
Source: Worldbank.
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Table 6.6 shows descriptives for crossborder observations.
Table 6.6. Descriptives
Variablename Mean Standard Deviation Min Max N
Sum of holdings 0.275 1.071 0 30 10494
Number of chains 2.536 4.551 1 110 10494
Wht (eff) 0.00631 0.0213 0 0.245 10494
Cgtax 0.261 0.123 0 0.590 10494
Cfcrule 100 0.599 0.490 0 1 10494
Taxhaven 0.0232 0.150 0 1 10494
Corporatetaxrate 0.312 0.0897 0 0.421 10494
Ln(toas) 15.01 2.405 3.236 19.81 10494
Ln(GDP/pc) 100 10.67 0.242 8.872 11.65 10494
Inflationrate 0.0268 0.0132 -0.00283 0.183 10494
Ln(dist) 7.356 1.248 4.088 9.860 10494
EU 0.556 0.497 0 1 10494
Descriptive statistics for the sample of cross-border observations. Each observation is
an aggregation of multiple ownership chains on a group/subsidiary country level. For
the definition of variables see table 6.5.
The structure, provided by Figure 6.2, is found in the dataset. For both years we
reconstruct the connection between the global ultimate owner (BP PLC) and the
lowest subsidiary (SE). This allows us to count the number of interposed holding
countries. In this example, we observe one holding company located in Belgium
for the year 2005. In 2012, the holding company is vanished in Belgium and we
identify a second, newly integrated subsidiary in Sweden (SEnew).
To conduct our analysis, detailed tax data is needed. The information on unilat-
eral international tax law is extracted from the IBFD country analyses and the
Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides, provided by Ernst and Young. Double tax
treaties in force were exploited for agreements, concerning the method to avoid
international double taxation. Besides, multilateral tax treaties were screened for
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Figure 6.2. Example
such rules90, as well as unilateral anti-abuse rules were accounted for on a country-
pair level. Information on source taxes was extracted from tax treaties. Capital
gains tax rates are taken from the IBFD country analyses and the Worldwide
Corporate Tax Guides, provided by Ernst and Young.
6.3.2. Econometric Approach. To test our first hypothesis, we define the number
of third-country holdings within each ownership chain as our measure for group's
complexity. As done by Dreßler (2012), holding-companies arranged in series
within the same state are not counted as an additional ownership level. Regarding
international taxation, those do not influence source or home country tax burdens.
From an organizational point of view, the relevance of country holdings is not
clear. This is the case because the above mentioned tax arguments, inducing a
certain degree of autonomy, are not valid within the same tax territory.91 Our
measure consists of a legal as well as a geographical component. All chains of
90These are: EU parent-subsidiary-directive, Caricom, WAEMU, WAEC, AEUC, OCAM,
UDEAC/CEMAC, Andean Community, Arab Maghreb Union and Nordic Convention.
91Especially the availability of group tax regimes allows for organizational unity.
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the same group, which reach the same country at the lowest level, are aggregated
and converted into an average number of holding countries interposed. This is
necessary to include subsidiaries that are newly integrated into the ownership
structure between 2005 and 2012.
We apply a difference-in-difference setting, referring to Ashenfelter and Card
(1985). Thereby, we utilize the fact that a small number of countries changed from
a worldwide system to an exemption system between 2005 and 2012. Countries
with a policy change are as listed in table 6.7.
Table 6.7. Countries with change in method to avoid double taxation
Country Year
Japan 2009
United Kingdom 2009
Norway 2006
Countries changing from worldwide taxation to a territorial system
between 2005 and 2012. In case of Norway this change is based on
a multilateral agreement (parent-subsidiary directive). Before, the
system to avoid international double taxation varied on a bilateral
basis in Norway.
Therefore, the treatment group is represented by all those country-pair observa-
tions, experiencing the policy change. All those observations, which are taxed
in a worldwide system or a territorial system without a change, are included as
control observations. This way, the change in the outcome variable of the control
group, can be substracted from the change in the treatment group. It is controlled
for permanent differences between the two groups as well as a common time trend
for both groups. Formally (see Greene (2012) pp. 195-198), the treatment effect
is measured by
effect = (h¯treatment2012 − h¯treatment2005 )− (h¯control2012 − h¯control2005 ).
h¯ is the mean of the count variable for the number of holding companies embedded
within the ownership chains for the respective group.
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The treatment effect is identified by testing the model:
y = β0+β1∗Treatment+β2∗After+β3∗(Treatment∗After)+β4∗controls+u.
y is the number of third country holdings. Treatment is equal to 1 for those
observations being exposed to the policy change and 0 otherwise. After is a
period dummy variable equal to 1 for the year after the policy change, 2012, and
0 otherwise. The interaction term Treatment ∗ After is 1 for all observations
in the treatment group after the policy change. Thus, β3 is our coefficient of
interest.
While OLS assumes a normal distribution and allows for positive and negative
values in the outcome variable, here data is strictly positive count data. While
this kind of data suggests the application of a Poisson model, consistent results
generally require the equality of the conditional mean and variance. Tests indicate
overdispersion in our data.92 We use robust standard errors in all estimations as
proposed by Cameron and Trivedi (2010).
6.4. Results.
6.4.1. Descriptive Evidence. Table 6.8 gives an overview over the number of for-
eign holding companies, implemented in the reconstructed ownership chains.
While the total number of crossborder ownership chains increases between 2005
and 2012 by about 100 percent, the share of indirectly held subsidiaries remained
almost stable, at about 11 percent. 93
92Estimating the equation V ar(y|x) = E(y|x)+α2E(y|x) allows to test for overdispersion. For
further details see Cameron and Trivedi (2010)
93The share of indirect ownership structures is below the one of Dreßler (2012). This can be
explained by the different handling of holding companies, as redundant observations.
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Table 6.8. Directly vs. indirectly held subsidiaries
2005 2012
Direct holding 15,912 30,984
Indirect holding 2,177 4,035
% held indirect 12.03 11.05
Distribution of directly and indirectly held
crossborder-subsidiaries in the sample.
As shown by table 6.9, indirect crossborder holdings are much more prevalent in
case of credit systems than in exemption systems. In exemption systems, their
share amounts to only 9 percent. In credit systems 18 percent of crossborder
ownership chains are indirect. In 2012, there are considerably more observations
for exemption systems in the dataset than for credit systems. This is caused by
the regional coverage of the Orbis database. The best coverage by the database is
among the European countries. The prevalence of the credit system is diminished
in this area.94
Table 6.9. Directly vs. indirectly held subsidiaries - by system to
avoid double taxation
Exemption Credit Exemption Credit
Holdings 2005 2005 2012 2012
Direct holding 9,772 6,105 24,348 6,636
Indirect holding 985 1,192 2,533 1,502
% held indirect 9.15 16.34 9.42 18.46
Number of directly and indirectly held crossborder-subsidiaries
by system to avoid double taxation.
Table 6.10 shows the average tax advantage of indirect ownership structures in
case of repatriation to the headquarter. Observations are classified by the system
to avoid international double taxation. Repatriation cost, in case of the real
94In our dataset, European countries, holding on to the credit system, are Ireland, Greece,
Poland and Portugal.
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indirect ownership structure, are compared to a hypothetical direct ownership.
For both systems, on average, repatriation tax cost increase slightly by imple-
menting holding companies.95 This result indicates that there are other, tax and
non-tax, factors affecting the ownership structure. These are not in line with the
minimization of repatriation cost and have to be controlled for.
Table 6.10. Tax advantage of indirect ownership - by system to
avoid double taxation
System Tax difference (av) Max Min
Exemption -0.002 -0.326 0.266
Indirect Credit -0.0002 -0.212 0.25
Average tax advantage of indirect ownership structures. Total
tax payments in case of repatriation are deducted from total
tax payments in the hypothetical case of a direct connection
(totaltaxdirect − totaltaxindirect). Tax payments are given for
one currency unit repatriated income, based on statutory tax
rates. Data used is for 2012.
In credit systems, it could be argued that repatriation tax cost are inevitable.
For this reason, firms should be indifferent in where and at which layer of the
ownership chain the tax is finally due. Only if a calculatory evasion is possible,
firms have an incentive to structure ownership chains tax optimally, abroad.
Table 6.11 subdivides total tax burden caused by repatriation along the ownership
chain. The first part is due for distributing dividends up to the first foreign
holding company, immediately below the headquarter. In addition, the second
part is due for the final step of repatriation to the headquarter. Both groups,
on average, have nearly the same tax burden for distributions up to the highest
holding level. Only the last step results in significantly higher taxes in case
of credit countries. This finding indicates that companies in credit countries
structure their group abroad tax efficiently. Thus, foreign source and repatriation
taxes seem to be relevant for their calculations.
95This finding is consistent with the one of Dreßler (2012).
133
Table 6.11. Composition of repatriation tax cost - by system to
avoid double taxation
Tax burden caused by
System distribution to first holding final repatriation
Exemption 0.015 0.002
Indirect Credit 0.013 0.097
Tax burden of indirectly held crossborder-subsidiaries is split up into
two parts: (1) Taxes caused by dividend distributions up to the first
foreign holding company. (2) Taxes caused by the final step of repa-
triation from this holding company to the headquarter. Observations
are categorized by the system to avoid double taxation. Systems are
only reported with more than 100 observations. Tax burdens are re-
ported as percentage of subsidiaries' income before tax. Tax burdens
include source taxes and repatriation tax. Data used is for 2012.
Even if there is evidence for the existence of tax planning incentives in worldwide
systems that requires a more complex group structure, it is not yet clear if there
is a higher degree of complexity in worldwide taxed groups than in territorial
systems. Figure 6.3 shows trends in the average number of holding countries
for the treatment and the control group. We observe a decrease in the average
number of holding companies interposed for those ownership chains, which receive
the policy change. In contrast, those chains, which are still subject to the credit
method, show an increase in complexity.
Figure 6.4 illustrates the trend in the average number of holding countries for
newly integrated subsidiaries. We identify a more pronounced decrease in com-
plexity for this subsample, which indicates that group structures are rigid over
time. Our data does not allow for retracing the exact time of integration. For
this reason, we cannot exclude subsidiaries, which are integrated after 2005 but
before the policy change. We would expect that in this case the structure is sticky
as well. Thus, we still underestimate the reaction in the outcome variable for the
group of new subsidiaries.
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Figure 6.3. Trends in the average number of holding companies
- all firms
While there is some descriptive evidence that groups reduce complexity after a
switch to a territorial system. We employ more sophisticated econometrics as
described above in section 6.3.2 to be able to conclude on a causal relationship.
The difference-in-difference estimator allows us to extract the effect of this policy-
change and to exclude other factors as well as unobserved differences between the
treated and the untreated.
6.4.2. Results. Tax exemption of foreign dividends can be defined in two ways:
The first definition rests solely on the tax base of the parent country. All those
combinations of the parent and subsidiary country are classified as tax exempted,
where the parent country includes not more than 5 percent of foreign dividends
into its' tax base.96
96There are several countries being considered as exemption countries that, in fact, include
a small share of foreign dividends into its own tax base. In this sample, these are Belgium,
Germany, France, Italy, Japan and Norway.
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Figure 6.4. Trends in the average number of holding companies
- new subsidiaries
The second definition takes into regard that despite a broader tax base there are
country pairs, where the tax burden of the subsidiary results in a tax credit, high
enough to outweigh the parent country tax. In these cases, there is no additional
repatriation tax due at the parent. This situation is economically equivalent to
tax exemption. For this reason, the tax cost definition redefines all those country
pairs as tax exempted, where the additional parent country tax is less than 2
percent of the pre-tax income of the subsidiary.97
Table 6.12 contains the results for the Poisson regressions. The dependent vari-
able is our measure of complexity: The total number of interposed holding coun-
tries between the headquarter and the lowest subsidiary. In our dataset, ob-
servations are aggregated on a group/subsidiary-country level. For this reason,
972 percent equals to the maximum tax burden of exemption countries in the sample, classified
by tax base definitions.
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the number of holding countries is the sum over up to 110 subsidiaries of the
same group within the same subsidiary country. To account for the number of
ownership chains involved, we apply this number as an exposure rate.
Treatment is a dummy variable, indicating if an observation is exposed to a
policy change. After is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is in
2012 and 0 otherwise. The interaction between these two variables, Aftertreat,
measures the causal effect of the policy change.
Although, there is little variation over the observed period, we control for a set
of tax variables, which could also affect the connection between the headquarter
and subsidiaries.
Well known tax practices target the reduction of withholding taxes. As these
regularly rely on holding structures, we control for those incentives. Wht(eff)
is the effective withholding tax rate in the source country for a (hypothetical)
direct connection.
If withholding taxes yield a final tax burden or not depends on the system
to avoid international double taxation. In case of credit systems, the relation
between the two tax rates within the involved countries is crucial. In regressions
(1) and (2) we rely on effective withholding taxes to take this relation into
account. In regressions (3) and (4) we include the statutory withholding tax
rate (Wht(stat)) instead.
Holding structures can be beneficial if investors have a potential exit in mind. If
capital gains taxes are high in the home country, holding companies in countries
with low capital gains tax rates can be used to defer capital gains abroad. Tax-
ation can be delayed for a certain period of time.
If tax rates are lower for dividends, capital gains can be converted into dividends
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out of the perspective of the home country. We include the capital gains tax rate
Cgtax in our regression to control for both incentives.98
As controlled foreign company rules (cfc-rules) can be appropriate to regulate tax-
planning activities of local groups, we include a dummy variable. The variable
Cfcrule is equal to 1 if the headquarter's country has such a rule in force and
0 otherwise.99If cfc-rules are binding we would expect less complex ownership
structures, as tax incentives are reduced. If tax payers can escape those rules
we would expect them to come along with an even more complex ownership
structure.
The variable Taxhaven is equal to 1 if the subsidiary country is a tax haven and
0 otherwise. Tax havens are characterized by a corporate tax rate of less than 15
percent.100
The corporate tax rate, Corporatetaxrate, controls for tax planning incentives
vis-à-vis the headquarter. The higher the tax burden of the headquarter is, the
more likely the group will use its foreign subsidiaries to shift profits at expense
of the headquarter.
Ln(toas) is the logarithm of total assets for the headquarter and controls for the
size of the group.101
Ln(dist) is the logarithm of the geographical distance between the most popu-
lated cities in the host and home country. This serves as a measure of an organi-
zational incentive to interpose holding companies. EU is a dummy variable equal
98There are countries with varying capital gains tax rates, depending on the length of the hold-
ing period. We assume a short-term investment because short-term investments are usually
penalized. These investments yield the highest incentive to avoid capital gains taxes. Fur-
thermore, we assume a non-quoted company. In case, Estonia, Greece, Japan, Korea, Turkey
differentiate between quoted and non-quoted companies. Again, the capital gains tax rate is
highest for non-quoted companies.
99Following the argumentation of Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013), we mark EU-countries, after
the Cadbury Schweppes decision of the ECJ, as non-cfc countries.
100Results are robust to the definition by a country list given by Hines and Rice (1994).
101If available, we rely on the consolidated balance sheet to picture the whole group. Results
are robust for a reduced sample of solely consolidated accounts.
138
to 1 if host and home country are within the EU and 0 otherwise. Ln(GDP/pc)
reflects the stage of development in the home country. Inflationrate measures
the economic risk of the host country.
All estimations apply group fixed effects to control for otherwise uncontrolled
heterogeneity. Robust standard errors are clustered on the group level.
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Table 6.12. Poisson regression - all subsidiaries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables taxbase repatcost taxbase repatcost
Treatment 0.371 0.320** 0.526* 0.371***
(1.37) (2.11) (1.84) (2.61)
After 0.175 0.0881 0.219 0.132
(0.87) (0.42) (1.06) (0.61)
Aftertreat -0.771*** -0.726*** -0.754*** -0.684***
(-3.86) (-3.60) (-3.77) (-3.42)
Wht (effective) 2.001 1.537
(1.35) (0.94)
Wht (statutory) 2.650*** 2.481***
(2.90) (2.63)
Cgtax 1.706 2.938* 1.766 2.961*
(1.03) (1.67) (1.06) (1.68)
Cfcrule 0.273 0.293 0.301 0.315
(1.31) (1.38) (1.42) (1.46)
Taxhaven 0.683*** 0.657*** 0.723*** 0.690***
(4.76) (4.49) (4.98) (4.68)
Corporatetaxrate 8.020*** 7.994*** 8.062*** 7.961***
(3.45) (3.44) (3.44) (3.41)
Ln(toas) 0.559** 0.580*** 0.557** 0.576***
(2.48) (2.58) (2.48) (2.58)
Ln(dist) 0.170** 0.170** 0.158** 0.156**
(2.43) (2.47) (2.23) (2.23)
EU -0.184 -0.183 -0.129 -0.128
(-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.29) (-0.29)
Ln(GDP_pc) 0.980 1.005 0.949 0.950
(1.07) (1.05) (1.04) (0.99)
Inflationrate -2.684 -2.041 -3.239 -2.758
(-0.96) (-0.75) (-1.14) (-0.99)
Observations 5240 5240 5240 5240
Number of groups 503 503 503 503
Results of Poisson regressions are presented. Dependend variable is
the number of third country holding companies interposed between the
headquarter and its' subsidiary. Observations are aggregated on a
group/subsidiary country level. Number of single observations per group
is used to calculate an exposure rate. The policy change from a credit sy-
stem to tax exemption (Treatment) is defined basing on the tax base and
alternatively on real repatriation cost, considering subsidiary's tax credits.
Group fixed effects are included in all regressions. Intra-group variation in
case of the tax base definition is given in Norway, where systems vary on a
bilateral level. Robust standard errors are clustered on the group level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6.12 contains the results of the Poisson estimations with the number of
third country holdings as dependent variable. For all specifications, significantly
negative coefficients for Aftertreatment show that the change from a world-
wide system to an exemption system is causal for shorter cross-border ownership
chains. In other words, corporate groups respond to the unfavorable credit sy-
stem with a higher degree of complexity. This complexity exceeds organizational,
risk and other needs.
A coefficient of -0.771 in estimation (1) means that the policy change leads to a
decrease in the number of third country holdings by a factor of 0.46.102
Confirming the results of other studies, we find a significant effect of withholding
taxes on the structuring of groups. With increasing withholding tax rates, the
complexity of group structures also increases.
Indeed, this is only true for statutory withholding tax rates, used in regressions
(3) and (4). Concerning effective withholding taxes in regressions (1) and (2)
we find a positive but insignificant effect. Statutory and effective withholding
taxes differ only in credit systems. Our results indicate that independently of the
method of avoidance of double taxation at the headquarter, withholding taxes
are perceived as final taxes.
The coefficient for the capital gains tax rate is also positive but of unsteady
significance.103
Longer ownership chains are used to connect subsidiaries in tax haven countries
to the group. This finding and the positive effect for the corporate tax rate of
the headquarter point out that subsidiaries are hidden in a complex structure
102As in the Poisson regression, the relationship between the logarithm of the dependent vari-
able and the independent variables is estimated. The incidence ratio for coefficient β can be
calculated by: eβ .
103There is less variation for capital gains tax rates over time. Thus, our setting is not appro-
priate to deeply analyze the occurrence of holding structures to ease exits.
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if they can be used to relocate tax base away from the headquarter. With the
size of the group, the subsidiary's organizational demand increases for additional
holding companies.
Also with growing geographical distance, an increasing number of holding coun-
tries can be observed.
We do not find any differences for the change in complexity between the two
definitions of tax exemption. This can be explained by the fact that on average
groups consist of chains into more than 4 different countries. Thus, excess credit
subsidiaries and subsidiaries with positive home country repatriation tax cost are
within the same group.
In case of sticky group structures, results in table 6.12 underestimate the effect
of changing tax conditions. Group structures have implications on organizational
processes. Structural reorganizations are costly. We expect a slow adjustment
over time instead of an immediate adjustment for those subsidiaries that were
integrated into the group under a worldwide system. Those companies, which
were integrated after the policy change, do not bear these reorganization cost.
Thus, we expect a more pronounced effect if we reduce the sample to those
subsidiaries, which were integrated after 2005. For these, we compare the 2012
measure of complexity with the one of the same group/subsidiary-country pair for
2005, as it is presented in table 6.13. The coefficients for the variable Aftertreat
are still significant in all specifications and more distinct than the coefficients
regarding all subsidiaries (table 6.12). Results indicate such an underestimation
caused by rigid group structures.
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Table 6.13. Poisson regression - only new subsidiaries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables taxbase repatcost taxbase repatcost
Treatment 0.140 0.332** 0.294 0.363***
(0.47) (2.23) (0.94) (2.74)
After 0.0396 -0.0667 0.0941 -0.0127
(0.17) (-0.27) (0.39) (-0.05)
Aftertreat -0.931*** -0.848*** -0.910*** -0.797***
(-4.23) (-3.18) (-4.13) (-2.99)
Wht (effective) 2.611 2.298
(1.48) (1.16)
Wht (statutory) 2.969*** 2.843**
(2.79) (2.55)
Cgtax 1.853 3.341* 1.914 3.374*
(1.03) (1.69) (1.07) (1.71)
Cfcrule 0.242 0.255 0.274 0.280
(1.08) (1.10) (1.21) (1.21)
Taxhaven 0.678*** 0.643*** 0.727*** 0.688***
(4.50) (4.19) (4.79) (4.47)
Corporatetaxrate 9.384*** 9.247*** 9.472*** 9.277***
(2.99) (2.96) (2.96) (2.93)
Ln(toas) 0.629** 0.657*** 0.627** 0.655***
(2.48) (2.60) (2.49) (2.61)
Ln(dist) 0.180** 0.180** 0.169** 0.168**
(2.30) (2.35) (2.14) (2.16)
EU -0.250 -0.249 -0.202 -0.202
(-0.54) (-0.54) (-0.43) (-0.43)
Ln(GDP_pc) 0.731 0.716 0.677 0.646
(0.76) (0.69) (0.71) (0.62)
Inflationrate -2.608 -1.951 -3.305 -2.775
(-0.86) (-0.66) (-1.05) (-0.91)
Observations 4206 4206 4206 4206
Number of groups 453 453 453 453
Results of Poisson regressions are presented. Dependent variable is the num-
ber of third country holding companies interposed between the headquarter
and its' subsidiaries. Subsidiaries, integrated after 2005, are compared to
those subsidiaries of the same group in the same country existing already
before. Observations are aggregated on a group/subsidiary-country level.
Number of single observations per group is used to calculate an exposure
rate. Group fixed effects are included in all regressions. Robust standard
errors are clustered on the group level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Local control group
So far, results rely on a foreign control group. TThis ignores possible changes in
country-specific preferences. We use a local control group as a robustness check.
We reduce the sample to groups being resident in Great Britain. This is the
country with the most observations. While we keep the definitions of treatment,
we define all purely domestic ownership chains as the control group. For this local
group we count the number of domestic holding companies interposed between
the headquarter and its' domestic subsidiary.
We expect group structures to react to tax cost of dividend repatriation. Those
incentives do not exist in a purely national setting. Dividend distributions within
a purely domestic ownership chain in 2005 as well as in 2012 were free of any
additional taxes. In contrast to the cross-border case, there was no necessity given
to adjust the group structure. The worldwide tax system, as well as the policy
change will not affect domestic ownership chains. All country-specific factors,
which influence both groups, can be eliminated.
Results, presented in table 6.14, confirm our findings. The coefficient for the
variable Aftertreat is significantly negative for both samples, all subsidiaries
and only new subsidiaries, and both definitions of tax exemption. The size of the
effects is in a range between factors of -0.15 and -0.32.
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Table 6.14. Robustness-Local control group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
all only new
Variables taxbase repatcost taxbase repatcost
Treatment -2.578*** 2.833*** -2.594*** 2.629***
(-7.24) (6.91) (-6.86) (8.10)
After -0.156 -2.837 -0.00380 -2.418
(-0.13) (-0.74) (-0.00) (-0.66)
Aftertreat -1.327** -1.895*** -1.156* -1.380**
(-2.22) (-3.17) (-1.87) (-2.32)
Wht (statutory) -1.266 -35.69 -2.875 -25.18
(-0.16) (-1.01) (-0.38) (-0.71)
Cfcrule -0.243 -1.766 0.432 -1.037
(-0.22) (-0.48) (0.42) (-0.30)
Taxhaven -0.223 -3.337*** -0.214 -3.185***
(-0.59) (-7.62) (-0.55) (-7.18)
Ln(toas) -0.0219 -0.0206 0.0209 0.0201
(-0.25) (-0.24) (0.24) (0.23)
Ln(dist) 0.536*** -2.148*** 0.590*** -2.003***
(4.14) (-7.38) (5.05) (-6.42)
EU 1.467** -3.471 1.517*** -3.246
(2.42) (-1.52) (2.90) (-1.56)
Inflationrate 11.72* 59.37*** 13.36** 52.22***
(1.86) (6.64) (2.42) (5.25)
Observations 2508 2508 1927 1927
Number of group 877 877 686 686
Results of Poisson regressions are presented. Dependent variable is the num-
ber of third country holding companies interposed between the headquarter
and its' subsidiaries. In columns (3) and (4) subsidiaries, integrated after
2005, are compared to those subsidiaries of the same group in the same
subsidiary country existing already before. Observations are aggregated on
a group/subsidiary-country level. Number of single observations per group
is used to calculate an exposure rate. Group fixed effects are included in all
regressions. Robust standard errors are clustered on the group level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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6.5. Conclusions. We hypothesize that credit systems set incentives for more
complex group structures. Organizational, risk and other firm-specific factors
determine group structures. Besides, groups, which are taxed worldwide, demand
a higher, tax-driven degree of complexity in their ownership structure. Thereby,
our measure of complexity has a legal as well as a geographical component.
Group structures are observed before and after a policy change from worldwide to
source based taxation. After the policy change, structures become less complex.
The number of third country holdings interposed into the ownership chain de-
creases by a factor of 0.46. The influence of withholding taxes can be confirmed.
It is the statutory withholding tax rate, which is relevant.
More complex group structures come along with less transparency and more
costly monitoring for outsiders. Complexity has an impact on the extent of
managerial diversion of firm-resources.
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7. General conclusions
Following mergers and acquisitions, a target firms' effective tax rate decreases
significantly. This decrease is especially pronounced if the acquirer is tax aggres-
sive. Moreover, the target firm's profitability decreases. This decrease is most
powerful if the acquirer is low taxed, enabling profit shifting.
The new profit shifting opportunities result in a positive investment effect for the
target firm. The number of employees and assets of the target firm increase.
If the target country restricts profit shifting via the manipulation of transfer
pricing, real activity will be shifted instead of pure profits. This shifting effect
dominates the investment effect, concerning labor intensive functions.
Consequently, the target country cannot prevent tax-induced profit shifting.
The acquirer's country of residence has an instrument to prevent tax-induced
profit shifting. Controlled foreign company rules can remove the incentive.
Worldwide taxation is not suitable. Firms use specific strategies to avoid home
country taxation of foreign earnings. To do so, their group structure has to be
adjusted and becomes more complex.
There are good reasons, why complex group structures may not be in line with
shareholder's interest. Here, future research may provide deeper insights.
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